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Pay-for-Performance to Improve the Value of Surgical Care: 
State of the Science and Empirical Evidence 
by 
Kyung Mi Kim 
Abstract 
Background 
Surgical care comprises 30% of hospital admissions and half of overall hospital costs. 
Surgical complications, in particular, increase hospital costs by approximately $20,000 per 
admission and extend hospital stays by 9.7 days. How to improve surgical care quality and 
reduce costs has attracted much attention from payers and policymakers. Pay-for-performance 
(P4P) schemes, along with other efforts, have emerged as a key tool for improving quality at 
reduced cost by linking payment to performance measures. 
Objectives 
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of P4P programs on 
improving the value of care for surgical patients. To address critical gaps in the literature, three 
primary aims are: (1) to identify the optimal payment design that maximizes the impact of P4P 
programs, (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of a mandated national P4P program launched by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and (3) to assess the potential negative 
consequences of P4P programs on patient outcomes.  
Methods 
To address Aim 1, a systematic review was conducted using five databases to understand 
how much variation in surgical outcomes is attributable to the design of P4P programs. Studies 
were selected for review based on PRISMA guidelines, and the quality of individual studies was 
 viii 
evaluated based on the STROBE checklist. To address Aim 2, an empirical study employing a 
propensity score weighted difference-in-differences design was performed to evaluate the impact 
of P4P programs on quality and cost outcomes of surgical care. To address Aim 3, another 
empirical analysis, building on the same statistical design as Aim 2, was performed to investigate 
the unintended consequences of P4P. 
Results and Implications 
The systematic review highlighted large variation in outcomes associated with payment 
designs of P4P programs. The evidence regarding preferred payment designs was inconclusive 
due to mixed results and studies lacking rigorous designs. Future studies are needed to draw 
stronger inferences about the best P4P payment design. 
The first empirical study found that the incidence of surgical site infection, length of stay, 
and hospital costs decreased following the implementation of a mandated national P4P policy. 
Policymakers may therefore consider these findings when considering the continuation and 
expansion of this P4P program, and other payers may also consider implementing a similar 
policy.  
Building on this analysis, the second empirical analysis found that patients treated in low-
income-serving hospitals had worsened surgical quality outcomes following the P4P policy. This 
highlighted the importance of monitoring for potential unintended consequences of P4P 
programs and indicated that solutions to addressing the quality chasm in surgical outcomes need 
to be developed if equity in outcomes, while improving care for all surgical patients, is to be 
achieved.  
 
 
 ix 
Conclusions 
P4P may be a promising strategy if designed carefully. This dissertation indicates that the 
increasing popularity of P4P programs could be a window of opportunity for providers, hospitals, 
and payers to align quality of care with expenditures through incentives. Monitoring for potential 
unintended consequences, especially for populations at risk, and strategies to counteract these 
unintended consequences are recommended components of all P4P programs.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Healthcare expenditures in the United States (U.S.) accounted for 17.9% of the gross 
domestic product in 2017, equivalent to $10,739 per capita.1 However, it is well documented that 
health outcomes (e.g., mortality, prevalence of chronic conditions, life expectancy) are not 
aligned with the amount of spending that occurs in the U.S., compared to other countries that are 
part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.2 For this reason, quality 
management and cost control in healthcare have received a great deal of attention in recent 
decades. Concern about whether it is possible to deliver high-quality care at a sustainable price 
has been a major priority among patients, healthcare providers, and policymakers.3  
Surgical care is often the only option for certain health conditions, such as for patients 
experiencing trauma. However, surgery comes with the risk of causing substantial harm to 
patients due to the complexity of surgical procedures.4 Over 17 million procedures were 
performed in U.S. acute care hospitals in 2014. Up to 25% of patients develop complications 
following inpatient surgeries, and almost 50% of all adverse events among inpatients are 
associated with surgical care.4 Approximately 30% of healthcare spending and half of hospital 
costs were related to surgical care in the U.S.5,6 Complications, in particular, can increase 
surgery-related healthcare costs by up to five times,7 and patients’ out-of-pocket expenses can be 
substantial. One percent of people in the U.S. are at risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket surgical 
expenditures, exceeding 10% of their total income.8 These high expenditures can be especially 
pernicious for vulnerable patients, such as minority and low-income patients.9 For these reasons, 
delivering high-value surgical care has attracted much attention, and numerous efforts have been 
made to improve surgical care. 
 
 
 3 
Background / Motivation 
Pay-for-performance (P4P) refers to various types of payment strategies (e.g., rewards, 
penalties, withholding payments, or a combination of these) that are linked to the performance of 
healthcare providers or organizations.10 P4P has been widely used as a means to improve 
healthcare quality and reduce costs by linking payment to quality of care,11–13 along with other 
efforts, such as National Patient Safety Goals by the Joint Commission14 and a national surgical 
quality improvement project by American College of Surgeons.15 More than a hundred P4P 
programs exist in the public and the private sectors.16 Over the past decade, large-scale P4P 
programs have been increasingly implemented in inpatient settings, led primarily by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).17,18  
 Yet evidence for the effects of P4P on improved quality and cost is mixed. Some studies 
have expounded that P4P has a modest impact but could potentially have a much bigger impact 
on enhancing the quality of care.19–23 Others found that P4P has had no effects on quality of care 
outcomes or evidence appears to be lacking regarding the cost-effectiveness of P4P.24–27 In 
addition, little is known about how the effects of P4P programs differ in terms of quality 
outcomes and cost of care among different types of patients, providers, and organizations. 
Different providers and organizations may show mixed interests in changing their behavior as a 
response to P4P. In other words, the motivation to adopt and adhere to interventions to improve 
the quality of care may vary by providers and hospitals under P4P. Moreover, spillover effects 
from P4P policy to non-targeted areas of care may be expected, which could in turn affect 
patients either positively or negatively.28  
P4P is intended to motivate providers and hospitals to improve quality of care, thereby 
reducing costs. Despite the potential for quality improvement in healthcare, concerns also exist 
 4 
about the unintended consequences of P4P, including healthcare providers’ avoidance of 
minority or sicker patients so as not to jeopardize outcomes, thus maximizing financial 
incentives.29–32 Healthcare providers also face pressure to achieve certain levels of outcomes 
regardless of their clinical judgment and patients’ preferences.32 In addition, P4P programs can 
be initiated by different entities (e.g., physician group, hospitals, states, and payers), which may 
affect the response to P4P programs and thus the effects of P4P programs (J. White, personal 
communication, May 16, 2019). 
There are significant gaps in the scientific literature regarding the impact of P4P on 
surgical patients. First, no studies have evaluated the effect of different P4P payment designs. 
Second, few studies have examined the effects of P4P on surgical patients, and existing studies 
have limitations in study design and analytic methods. Third, few studies have examined the 
potential negative consequences of P4P including: non-reporting of surgical complications, 
potential overtreatment of target conditions, decreased focus on nontarget conditions, avoidance 
of high-risk patients, and putting hospitals that are financially unstable or serve large shares of 
socioeconomically disadvantaged patients at risk.  
Significance of the Dissertation  
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of P4P on improving 
the value of care for surgical patients in order to help fill a gap in the literature. Specifically, I 
evaluate a CMS P4P policy that was introduced in 2008. This mandated national P4P program, 
named the hospital-acquired conditions present on admission (HAC-POA) policy, penalizes 
hospitals for selected high-cost and/or high-volume procedures by not paying for treating 
complications if they developed during a patient’s hospitalization. When these complications 
develop during a patient’s hospitalization, hospitals would be paid as though certain 
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complications were not present; thus, they would have to absorb the cost of treating these 
complications. The complications initially included in 2008 were expanded from 10 categories to 
14 categories in 2013, and no changes have been made since. Categories of complications 
included in this P4P program are: (1) foreign objects retained after surgery, (2) surgical site 
infection (SSI) following coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), (3) SSI following a cardiac 
implantable electronic device (CIED), (4) SSI following bariatric surgery, (5) SSI following 
certain orthopedic procedures, (6) deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE) 
following specific orthopedic procedures, (7) air embolism, (8) blood incompatibility, (9) stage 
III and IV pressure ulcers, (10) falls and trauma, (11) manifestations of poor glycemic control, 
(12) catheter-associated urinary tract infections, (13) vascular catheter-associated infection, and 
(14) iatrogenic pneumothorax with venous catheterization.33 This HAC-POA policy applies to all 
acute care hospitals reimbursed under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System from the CMS. 
This dissertation study assesses the evidence on the effects of P4P payment designs in 
surgical care and provides insights into how best to design P4P payment to maximize its impact 
(Chapter 2). How to provide incentives is a key consideration in designing P4P programs. 
Therefore, it is critical to understand how much variation in outcomes is attributable to the 
payment structure of P4P design. In addition, the evidence on the positive and negative effects of 
P4P as a policy effort is examined, using nationally representative groups of patients and 
hospitals. Two key areas evaluated in depth as part of this dissertation are: the effects of P4P on 
quality and cost (Chapter 3) and unintended consequences of P4P (Chapter 4).  
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical perspectives underlying this dissertation are prospect theory34 and 
transaction cost economics (TCE) theory.35 Prospect theory provides a foundation on which to 
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understand the psychological response to different payment designs. TCE theory provides a 
rationale for examining the variations in the quality and cost outcomes of P4P in different 
hospitals.  
Prospect theory offers a theoretical perspective on the factors that influence behavioral 
changes of individual providers and organizations in response to P4P. It also provides an 
understanding of how to incentivize and frame P4P programs to maximize their impact. Prospect 
theory demonstrates that choice behavior is based on gains or losses from a reference point rather 
than the final outcome and that people tend to be more sensitive to losses than gains. As a 
consequence, the disadvantage may appear to be larger than the advantage of a change; people 
favor adhering to a current choice rather than making changes, defined as status quo bias.36 It is 
also suggested that preferences and decisions are malleable depending on how options are 
framed.  
Therefore, prospect theory can be applied in the context of P4P related to (1) why P4P 
may be needed, (2) how to incentivize, (3) what to incentivize, and (4) how to maximize the 
response to P4P. First, people’s tendency to remain at the status quo might provide a rationale as 
to why interventions, such as P4P, might be needed to make a change in providers’ and 
hospitals’ behaviors. Second, prospect theory provides insight on how to incentivize. Recently, 
penalty schemes have been increasingly utilized. Prospect theory would predict that providers 
may be more sensitive to losses than gains.34,37 Therefore, P4P programs with penalty strategies 
may have a bigger impact on behavior changes than those with incentives. Third, if P4P 
programs only link payment to specific areas and measures of care, providers or hospitals may 
focus disproportionately on P4P targets. This occurs because people tend to make decisions in 
isolation instead of evaluating all consequences when making multiple choices.34 Therefore, 
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nontarget areas of P4P programs might be ignored although they do not generate maximum 
benefits for providers as a whole,38,39 due to decreased quality of care in general and thus 
worsened reputations. Fourth, prospect theory may help to explain the importance of framing 
P4P payment strategies. If framed as losses, such strategies may have a bigger effect on the 
response to P4P. Therefore, framing incentives as possible losses by withholding total payments 
may be an effective method for changing behavior. 
Building on the understanding of the role of P4P designs and framing on behavioral 
changes from the prospect theory perspective, the implications regarding variations in a 
hospital’s response to P4P can be explained by TCE theory. With the concepts of bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity, TCE theory provides an analytical framework for 
examining how hospitals adopt P4P policies and why responses to policies vary among different 
providers and hospitals. Bounded rationality holds that human agents intend to be rational but 
have limited cognitive ability to deal with complexity, such as problem-solving processes or 
finding alternatives.35,40,41 Opportunism is the assumption that at least some human agents are not 
fully trustworthy and will prioritize their own interests over that of the organization.35 Asset 
specificity identifies whether an asset is specific to a particular transaction and required for an 
organizational activity, such as production or governance.35 When limited alternatives are 
available for a transaction, greater asset specificity means that the organization has to bear higher 
transaction costs; conversely, the organization’s transaction costs are lower when more options 
are available.35  
Interventions to improve quality are inconsistently applied and often improperly used, 
and obtaining a significant effect is extremely costly,42,43 partly because multiple P4P programs 
are in effect simultaneously. Each hospital is also expected to implement a customized policy to 
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improve quality of care depending on the characteristics of its patients, outcome priorities, 
available resources, and organizational objectives. From a TCE perspective, the organizational 
knowledge, skills, and information required to establish a system and successfully launch P4P 
may be attributed to differing levels of bounded rationality in various organizations. Bounded 
rationality coupled with uncertainty and complexity of healthcare delivery systems may limit an 
organization’s decision-making ability when implementing P4P. Bounded rationality may also 
limit an organization’s ability to utilize P4P, which is often designed with complex incentive 
schemes. Opportunism may refer to problems that arise when individual providers’ behaviors do 
not align with an organization’s interests. P4P is viewed as a means to decrease opportunistic 
behavior between patients and providers or between providers and healthcare organizations by 
linking payment to objective performance measures (J. White, personal communication, April 26, 
2017) 44 although P4P could induce gaming behavior (e.g., coding change).45 Thus, failure to 
implement P4P further limits an organization’s ability to monitor providers’ hidden actions and 
acquire their hidden knowledge. According to the TCE theory, organizations should adopt a 
different governance structure under P4P depending on asset specificity. Organizations need to 
structure contracting when assets are not specific and, conversely, displace markets internally 
when assets are highly specified.35 This is in part because it usually takes a long time to develop 
highly specified assets.35 Moreover, highly specified assets put buyers and sellers in a vulnerable 
position because only a limited number of alternatives are available.46 Thus, organizations tend 
to internalize highly specific assets.  
The TCE theory identifies ex ante types of transaction costs as the costs of “drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement” 43(p.20) and ex post transaction costs as the costs 
related to maladaptation, negotiation, setup and operation of governance structures, and 
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maintenance to effectively secure contracts. TCE focuses on how to reduce ex post costs through 
choosing an appropriate governance structure. Hospitals engage in transactions with various 
stakeholders, including patients, healthcare providers, manufacturers of healthcare supplies, 
government agencies, payers, and accrediting agencies. These transactions occur in the broader 
healthcare market and organizations. The transaction costs associated with P4P include 
production costs (e.g., materials, labor, and equipment costs) and coordination costs (e.g., costs 
of setting up and maintaining a supply department in the organization, identifying the right 
suppliers, applying the right physical and human inputs at a given place and time, and 
disseminating the product throughout the organization).48,49 According to Williamson’s 
definition,47 the ex ante transaction costs of P4P policies include costs related to drafting a 
customized policy for each hospital, negotiating with suppliers in the market and with 
professionals in and outside the organization, and securing contracts. Supplies that hospitals need 
to purchase to run P4P programs include goods related to medical and pharmaceutical treatment; 
infrastructure to support documentation, such as information technology (IT) and personnel 
(clinician and non-clinician) to run the program efficiently. Ex post transaction costs can occur 
for several reasons: (1) suppliers behave differently than specified in the contract, thereby 
necessitating renegotiation, behavioral correction, or early termination of the contract; (2) better 
suppliers in the market were previously overlooked because of the organization’s limited 
information and bounded rationality; (3) the organization selects the wrong governance structure 
for the transactions as a result of its management of the contract with its physical and human 
assets; or (4) the organization sets up and runs its internal team to support P4P programs.  
When dealing with recurring transactions for supplies that are essential to P4P, but are 
not specified assets (e.g., IT programs, supplies), healthcare organizations are most likely to 
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contract in the market to reduce ex post transaction costs. In other words, adopting a hierarchical 
governance structure internally for non-specified assets would incur much higher ex post 
transaction costs. In contrast, TCE would propose that human assets in P4P programs be highly 
specified. Human resources needed for P4P may include training or acquiring professionals who 
have the right skills and abilities to efficiently provide quality care and training non-clinical 
operations personnel who understand P4P program requirements and undergo continuous 
education to process the data accurately to comply with any updates. Collaboration across 
disciplines, which also entails high transaction costs, is crucial to the development of a 
customized intervention as a response to P4P; therefore, hospitals should adopt “unified 
structures, where the transaction is removed from the market and organized within the firm 
subject to an authority relation (vertical integration).”47(p76) If an asset is highly specified but 
infrequently procured, such as customized computer software or low-volume services, healthcare 
organizations should choose trilateral governance, also known as a hybrid form governance, such 
as long-term contracting and franchising.50 Using a trilateral governance structure, hospitals can 
reduce ex post transaction costs by eliminating setup costs, which are often high, and reducing 
the opportunity costs resulting from being in either the market or a unified governance 
structure.47 For example, if hospitals provide a service for only a small number of procedures 
that require expertise of individual providers, highly trained staff and infrastructure to support 
not only the procedure itself but also pre- and post-treatment (e.g., transplantation or cardiac 
procedure), trilateral governance may need to be considered to reduce ex post transaction costs 
from the TCE perspective. Trilateral governance, in this case, would entail contracting out a 
specific service that requires highly specified assets but occurs infrequently in other hospitals 
that are already equipped with these assets. In the context of P4P, some hospitals, especially 
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those whose service volume is not too small but also not large enough to cover ex post 
transaction costs with benefits generated by the services provided, may be attracted to adopting a 
hierarchical governance structure internally depending on the size of the incentive they could 
obtain from a P4P program by meeting performance levels. Therefore, it is important to figure 
out the right incentive sizes not only to motivate individual providers but also to maximize 
responses from organizations when designing a P4P program. 
Even if a healthcare organization does not have enough resources to support the ex post 
transaction costs, it still needs to meet the standard of care imposed by agencies, such as CMS or 
other payers. P4P encourages hospitals to implement evidence-based practices as policy and 
adopt innovative technologies to improve the quality of care; it does so by incentivizing well-
performing hospitals or penalizing noncompliance based on the threshold that is specifically set 
for a P4P program. However, this encouragement might not be feasible for healthcare 
organizations that deliver services targeted by P4P programs at a low volume of services. TCE 
proposes a hybrid governance structure for highly specific but low frequency assets because 
highly specified assets, such as skilled and experienced personnel, may not be available in those 
hospitals. If they decide to invest internally in a unified governance and implement poorly 
designed interventions, they will suffer from insignificant effects and pay excessively for the 
costs of internally developed interventions (ex post transaction costs), which explains why P4P is 
effective in some organizations but not others. It could also apply to P4P target conditions. 
Among various target conditions, investing in high-volume conditions may improve the quality 
of response to P4P in an organization, whereas in other conditions it may not be beneficial. This 
also raises the issue of worsening the financial status for already poorly performing hospitals by 
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P4P implementation. They need to contract with others in the market to obtain highly specified 
assets, or they will suffer from penalties or no incentives from P4P programs.  
To evaluate the impact of P4P, a conceptual framework has been developed for this 
dissertation, based on the framework employed by Damberg et al.,51 which integrates the 
prospect and TCE theories as well (Figure 1.1). The framework depicts links among the factors 
at the patient, provider, and organization levels. This conceptual framework posits patient 
characteristics, behavioral changes of provider and organization, and external factors as three 
major risk factors. Patient characteristics refer to sociodemographics (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, 
age, income, insurance type) and comorbidities. Provider characteristics include providers’ 
sociodemographics and specialties, which could impact their behavioral changes in response to 
P4P. Organizational characteristics include case mix (disproportionate share of sicker patients), 
academic affiliation, ownership, number of beds, case volume, and location, all of which could 
impact organizational decision making. The behavioral response to P4P mediates the relationship 
between P4P policy implementation and outcomes. Provider and organizational characteristics 
are identified as potential confounders that affect responses to and outcomes of P4P programs. 
External factors include regulatory changes, other P4P programs, quality-improvement initiatives, 
and patient demands, all of which may moderate P4P’s effect.  
In summary, quality improvement and cost control in healthcare have received significant 
attention in recent decades, and P4P has been widely used as a policy lever to improve quality 
and lower costs. Few researchers have focused on surgical care, even though surgical procedures 
comprise about 30% of hospital stays and account for approximately half of hospital costs.52 The 
P4P policy evaluation in this dissertation will fill a critical gap in the literature and contribute to 
improving quality and costs for surgical patients. 
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Notes: The figure presented the modified conceptual framework adapted by Damberg et al. (2014).  
Figure 1.1 Conceptual framework of factors affecting the effects of pay-for-performance 
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Chapter 2: A Systematic Review of the Effects of Pay-for-Performance Design on Quality 
and Cost Outcomes for Surgical Patients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
ABSTRACT 
Objective: To evaluate the current state of evidence on the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) 
on quality and cost for surgical patients by P4P payment designs. 
Background: P4P has been widely implemented to deliver improved quality of care at a reduced 
cost. Although the number of studies evaluating P4P has been growing, few studies have 
examined the effects in surgical care. Prior systematic reviews are outdated, and little is known 
about how payment designs contribute to the effects of P4P.  
Methods: We conducted a systematic review using five databases. The studies were selected 
based on PRISMA guidelines. The methodological quality of individual studies was evaluated 
based on the STROBE checklist.  
Results: Sixteen studies evaluated P4P in an inpatient setting for surgical care between 2003 and 
2017. We identified 10 unique P4P programs: five used rewards; two used penalties; and three 
used a combination of rewards and penalties as a payment strategy. Evidence on the effects of 
P4P on improved surgical quality and cost was mixed in the context of payment design.  
Conclusions: Due to considerable variations in P4P designs and a lack of rigorous studies, the 
degrees of variations in outcomes that are attributable to P4P payment designs are inconclusive. 
Future studies are needed to make a valid and definite conclusion about the best payment 
strategy for maximizing the effect of P4P. 
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INTRODUCTION 
National expenditures on surgical care are $400 billion per year, which accounts for 30% 
of all healthcare spending and 50% of hospital costs.1,2 Over 17 million surgical procedures were 
performed in the United States at acute care hospitals in 2014.3 Surgical complications, defined 
as undesirable and unintended results from surgery,4 include: surgical site infections (SSIs), 
postoperative retained foreign bodies, perioperative pulmonary or venous embolisms, pressure 
ulcers, postoperative sepsis, and death. Depending upon the type of procedure, a 3.0–17.4% rate 
of surgical complications has been reported,5 with an increase of $6,139–$17,850 in hospital 
costs per patient stay.6 In this context, improving surgical care quality and cost is critical, not 
only for patients who undergo surgery but for healthcare delivery more broadly. 
Pay-for-Performance Policy for Surgical Patients 
Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely implemented as a means of delivering 
economically viable high-quality care that links various types of payment strategies to the 
performance of healthcare providers and organizations.7–9 Over the past decade, large-scale P4P 
programs have been launched in inpatient settings, led primarily by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS).10,11 Yet evidence of the effects of P4P on improved quality and cost is 
mixed, with some programs demonstrating unintended consequences such as limited access to 
care for vulnerable populations and a larger quality gap between organizations treating more 
high-risk patients than those that do not. 9,10,12–14 In addition, little is known about how quality 
outcomes and cost of care of P4P programs vary for patients, providers, and organizations with 
different characteristics. Providers and organizations may show differing degrees of motivation 
to make changes that improve the quality of care as a response to P4P. Moreover, P4P policies 
may have spillover effects on non-targeted conditions.15 Providers and hospitals may implement 
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interventions to improve performance for the targeted conditions, which also improve care for 
non-targeted conditions. Conversely, the outcomes of the non-targeted conditions may worsen if 
providers and hospitals allocate resources away from non-targeted conditions toward targeted 
conditions.  
How to incentivize through penalties or rewards is a key to designing P4P programs. 
Therefore, it is critical to understand how much variation in outcomes is attributable to the P4P 
design. Penalty strategies may have a more substantial effect on behavioral changes than rewards 
because providers and hospitals may be more sensitive to losses than gains.16,17 Although 
penalties have recently become a common scheme in P4P programs, how the magnitude of P4P’s 
effect differs by payment designs is unknown.   
The aim of this systematic review is to assess the current state of evidence on the impact 
of P4P payment design on quality and cost for surgical patients. Although several systematic 
reviews have examined the relationship between P4P program characteristics and its impact, 
such as understanding the optimal level of the incentive, no prior study has reviewed how 
different payment designs contribute to the effects of P4P. In addition, the majority of the 
systematic reviews were conducted more than five years ago. Our study provides insight into 
how best to design P4P payment programs to maximize its impact on target outcomes. 
METHODS 
Literature Search 
Five databases were used to conduct a systematic review of the effects of P4P payment 
design on the quality and cost of surgical care: PubMed, Embase, EconLit, the Database of 
Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness, and the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. A 
Google Scholar search, reference list reviews, and a search for selected P4P researchers were 
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also used. Studies on P4P in hospitals gained attention about a decade ago, therefore, the search 
was limited to studies published between 2003 and 2017.18 Multiple combinations of nine 
keywords—“pay for performance,” “financial,” “incentive,” “reward,” “bonus,” “penalty,” 
“reimburse,” “inpatient,” and “surgery”— were used to conduct literature searches in the 
selected databases. Using a modified strategy employed by a 2014 RAND review of P4P 
publications and a work of Milstein and Schreyoegg,9 as well as “OR” and “AND” as search 
terms to include all nine keywords yielded more than 3,100 articles from the five databases. The 
literature search terms used in each database and the corresponding results in detail are described 
in Appendix 2.1.  
Selection Criteria 
Only studies that met all of the following criteria were included: (a) full text available in 
English, (b) published between 2003 and 2017, (c) evaluated P4P solely implemented in the 
hospital sector, (d) analyzed the effects of P4P for surgical care, (e) assessed a P4P that used a 
financial strategy targeting providers (as opposed to targeting patients), and (f) demonstrated 
either quantitative or qualitative empirical analysis, or both.  
Study Selection and Data Extraction 
The study selection process was based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). One researcher (KK) conducted the database search, 
and two researchers (KK and UM) independently reviewed the titles and abstracts of all studies 
identified in the initial search and selected articles for the primary review following the selection 
criteria. The full-text articles were obtained, and two researchers (KK and UM) independently 
reviewed all studies to determine eligibility for final inclusion in this review. Any disagreements 
were resolved by consensus. To evaluate the quality of the included studies, we used the 
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Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) checklist.19–21 
We assigned one point for each successfully addressed item in the 22 STROBE checklist and 
calculated the sum of the score for each study. Figure 2.1 presents the study selection process 
based on the PRISMA flow diagram.22  
RESULTS 
Characteristics of the Studies 
This review included 16 studies that met the inclusion criteria (see Appendix 2.2 for the 
details of each study analyzed). The majority of the studies were published after 2010. The study 
population included inpatient surgical patients for the following procedures: coronary artery 
bypass graft [CABG] (eight studies), trauma (one study), bariatric surgery (two studies), 
orthopedic surgery (five studies), including total hip arthroplasty (THA), total knee arthroplasty 
(TKA), neck, shoulder, elbow, hip fracture, or spine surgery, vascular surgery (one study), 
obstetrics (one study), and general surgical care (four studies). Some studies evaluated more than 
one surgical procedure. Nine studies included patients who underwent surgery for non-targeted 
conditions or patients in non-P4P program-participating hospitals as the control group. All other 
seven studies did not have a control group. Two studies used propensity score matching, seven a 
difference-in-differences (DD) or difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) design, two 
used the DD with a propensity score matched sample, and one study applied an interrupted time 
series analysis. The average STROBE score was 19.3 out of 22 (range 11 to 22).  
Key Features of the P4P Programs in the Included Studies  
Table 2.1 summarizes payment designs and other key features of P4P programs (i.e., 
implementation years, target, payment design, payment size, number of participating hospitals, 
and other important features). The following ten specific P4P programs were included in this 
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review: Hospital-Acquired Conditions Presented on Admission (HAC-POA), Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), Hospital Quality Service and Recognition (HQSR), 
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP), Long Island provider-initiated P4P, 
MassHealth, the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (PHQID) phase I and II, 
providers in a private health system–initiated P4P (ProvenCare), and a single hospital turnover-
time reduction program (FIP). Five of 10 P4P programs included in this review were initiated by 
CMS (the HAC-POA, the HRRP, the HVBP, and the first and second phase of the PHQID), one 
was initiated by a single payer (the HQSR), another by a single state (MassHealth), and three by 
a single or group of providers or hospitals (Long Island provider-initiated P4P, ProvenCare, and 
FIP). The majority of targeted surgical procedures of P4P programs in the studies were CABG, 
hip fracture, THA, and TKA. We classified P4P by payment design into three categories: 
rewards, penalties, and the combination of both. Five P4P programs (FIP, HQSR, MassHealth, 
the first phase of the PHQID, and ProvenCare) utilized reward; two programs (HAC-POA and 
HRRP) used penalty; and three (HVBP, Long Island provider-initiated P4P, and the second 
phase of the PHQID) used the combination of reward and penalty as a payment strategy.  
Table 2.2 shows the summary characteristics of P4P programs included in this review, 
showing substantial variability across P4P programs. The majority of the programs were aimed 
at hospitals (80%). Mandatory P4P programs were all introduced by CMS, and no P4P programs 
solely penalized relative performance in contrast to absolute performance. The first reward-based 
P4P program was implemented in 2001. In 2004, the first P4P program used a combination of 
reward and penalty was implemented. A penalty-based P4P program was first implemented in 
2008.  
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Effects of P4P on Quality and Cost of Surgical Care 
Fifteen of the 16 studies evaluated the quality of care related to P4P involving surgical 
patients using reward (7), penalty (4), or a combination of reward and penalty (4). Four of the 16 
studies evaluated the cost of care related to P4P using reward (2), penalty (1), and the 
combination of both (1). Table 2.3 summarizes the number of studies by payment designs of P4P 
programs (i.e., reward, penalty, or the combination of both) and direction of effects (i.e., positive, 
negative, null, or mixed). The quality outcomes assessed in these P4P programs varied among 
studies and included mortality, readmissions, length of stay (LOS), number of procedures, 
number of complications, composite quality process score, operating room (OR) turnover time, 
on-time start of the first surgery of the day, and surgery within a certain time frame. The cost 
outcomes evaluated in these programs include program operation costs, Medicare costs, and 
payments received by hospitals.   
Quality of Surgical Care for Reward-Based Programs  
The seven studies25,28,30,32,34–36 evaluating the effect of P4P with reward design had mixed 
results. Four of the seven studies found a significant effect of the P4P implementation on at least 
one of the outcomes; three found a positive effect,28,30,36 while one study found a negative 
effect.34 Positive effects included reduced turnover time in the OR and reduced LOS. The 
negative impacts of P4P with reward consisted of reduced access to surgical care for non-White, 
Black, or Hispanic cardiac patients. Two of the three studies that reported improvements were 
related to P4P programs implemented by providers or hospitals, not by payors.28,36 
Quality of Surgical Care for Penalty-Based Programs  
The four studies15,26,31,39 that examined outcomes of penalty based P4P programs on the 
quality of surgical care did not congruently show that penalty designs were effective. This was 
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due to (1) improvements in both targeted and non-targeted procedures,31,39 or (2) lack of 
comparison to non-targeted procedures.26 One study15 observed a positive spillover effect of a 
penalty for Medicare patients on certain surgical conditions for all payers. However, it also 
showed a null finding for nonsurgical outcomes.  
Quality of Surgical Care for Combined Reward and Penalty-Based Programs  
The four studies23,24,33,38 that evaluated the effects of P4P with combined payment design 
did not show any significant results. Three of the studies that evaluated the PHQID, which used 
reward payment in the first phase and a combined reward and penalty payment for the second 
phase, did not observe either a significant improvement or a negative impact on patient outcomes. 
The fourth study33 found a decreased LOS and an improved quality of care. However, this study 
was descriptive, and no statistical significance was reported. 
Cost of Surgical Care  
Four of the 16 studies investigated the effect of P4P on the cost of surgical care using a 
reward,28,35 penalty,26 and the combination of reward and penalty.29 One study evaluated a single 
hospital-initiated P4P program with a reward for providers and reported improved efficiency in 
the OR and estimated savings.28 Three studies that examined CMS-initiated P4P programs 
reported mixed effects.26,29,35 Ryan35 investigated P4P with rewards and found no evidence for a 
reduction in costs for CABG patients. The Kandilov et al. study26 consisted of a descriptive 
analysis of surgical care costs after implementation of the CMS P4P that utilizes a penalty design 
and was not a comparison of the pre- and post-implementation. Therefore, this study did not 
provide evidence for improvement in the costs of care related to the P4P program. Another study 
by Ryan et al.29 compared the effect of a P4P payment program that used a combined reward and 
penalty design with different incentive sizes based on quality outcomes post implementation. 
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They found that hospitals with larger shares of socioeconomically disadvantaged patients 
received more incentives. However, this was due to an incentive size change that was introduced 
towards the later phase of the program, not due to a quality improvement. We conclude from 
these studies that evidence regarding the effects of P4P programs on cost is limited and remains 
largely unknown.  
DISCUSSION 
This systematic review evaluated the effects of different P4P payment designs. We found 
that due to considerable variations in P4P designs and a lack of rigorous studies, the variation in 
quality and cost outcomes of surgical care as attributable to P4P payment designs is inconclusive. 
First, studies that evaluated P4P programs substantially varied in their payment design features 
and outcome measures, making the comparison of findings across studies difficult. Few studies 
evaluated the same P4P programs, except for the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration, which was evaluated in 6 studies. Additionally, the design features of P4P, such 
as the incentive size and payment types, generally do not change once implemented.40 This 
hinders studies from rigorously examining the effects of different features, as little variation 
exists. As a result of this paucity of research analyzing heterogeneity across P4P program 
features,40 we cannot conclude that one payment design was more effective than another, 
suggesting that further research is needed. 
Second, limitations in study design and analytic methods did not allow us to determine 
the effectiveness of P4P beyond cross-sectional or observational evidence. We did not find 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), as RCTs are rarely used to evaluate P4P programs due to 
the high costs of RCTs.41 The majority of studies in this review utilized cross-sectional data and 
did not have a comparison group or accounted for other overlapping initiatives. Some studies 
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used more advanced analytic methods, such as a DD or DDD model, and propensity score 
matching, to overcome the limitations of observational data. These studies have produced more 
robust results of the effects of P4P. However, additional research using such designs is needed to 
validate these effects. Further, studies using different populations are required to generalize the 
findings. Few studies have investigated the long-term effects of P4P, but longer-term analyses 
are necessary to fully understand effects that may take time to surface.  
Third, although one of the main purposes of P4P is cost reduction, few studies have 
evaluated the impact of P4P on cost outcomes for surgical care, a high cost setting of healthcare 
delivery. One reason for the lack of studies focusing on cost outcomes could be an uneasiness in 
the United States to ration healthcare based on cost.42 Some policymakers argue against using 
cost-effectiveness as a reason to cut expensive yet effective treatments.43 The Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute44 also prohibits the use of a dollar-per-quality-outcome 
measurement in establishing treatment recommendations.45 Despite the ethical complexities of 
healthcare rationing that underline these recommendations, payers and many other policymakers 
have had a substantial interest in implementing P4P programs to justify vast health expenditures 
to achieve better health outcomes in scarce-resource settings.46 
Our findings suggest that P4P programs initiated by providers or hospitals may have a 
more positive effect compared with those initiated by payers. Two of three studies on the 
implementation of P4P programs by providers or hospitals reported positive effects. A few 
potential explanations exist as to why P4P programs by payers might be less effective. One is the 
crowding out effect of intrinsic motivators.47 For example, some studies found that extrinsic 
motivators, such as financial incentives, crowd out intrinsic motivators, such as achievement, 
increased responsibility, growth, recognition, and advancement, whereas other studies have 
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reported little evidence that P4P programs crowd out intrinsic motivators.48,49 A potential 
crowding out effect of intrinsic motivators might negatively influence the accomplishment of 
tasks,50 thus making a P4P program more likely to be ineffective. Another explanation for why 
P4P programs by payers are potentially less effective is related to providers’ and hospitals’ 
possibly negative reaction to payer-initiated P4P.46,51 Although providers and hospitals generally 
support quality improvement initiatives, resistance may be felt for penalty-based P4P 
programs.46,51 For example, disagreement exists over resources consumed by P4P programs that 
do not directly improve care.46 When providers and hospitals are less likely to accept P4P 
programs, they may not change their behavior, potentially leading to unintended consequences 
for patient care. This may be especially true when rewards are small,46,50,52,53 or penalties are 
used.9,53  
This review has two notable limitations. First, a meta-analysis could not be conducted 
because not enough current studies evaluated the same outcomes. If future studies become 
available, a meta-analysis may be able to produce quantifiable summary data on the effectiveness 
of specific payment design. Second, our findings cannot be generalized to all surgical care 
because the majority of studies evaluating P4P programs targeted only CABG, THA, or TKA.  
In summary, P4P has been used as a tool to improve quality at a reduced cost since the 
early 2000s and will likely function as an important policy for the foreseeable future. With the 
growing volume and high cost of surgical procedures, P4P initiatives are increasingly popular in 
surgical settings. This review raises concerns about the evidence of P4P by payment design. 
Contrary to recent developments to include penalty designs as a key feature in P4P programs, our 
findings indicate scarce evidence on their effectiveness. Future studies must rigorously evaluate 
 33 
the payment designs of P4P so a conclusion can be drawn on their effectiveness and guide those 
involved in designing P4P policies. 
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Figure 2.1 PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) 
Flow Diagram to Select Studies Included in the Literature Review  
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Abstract 
Importance: Surgical complications, defined as the adverse and unintended results of a surgical 
procedure, increase hospital costs by approximately $20,000 per admission and extend hospital 
stays by 9.7 days. Improving surgical care quality and reducing cost is critical not only for 
patients who undergo surgery, but also for healthcare providers, hospitals, and payers. 
Objective: To evaluate the association of the Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present on 
Admission (HAC-POA) policy, a mandated national pay-for-performance program, with the 
incidence of surgical site infections (SSI) and deep vein thrombosis (DVT), length of stay, in-
hospital mortality, and hospital costs in certain targeted cardiac, orthopedic, and bariatric 
surgeries (treatment group) compared to nontargeted cholecystectomy and appendectomy 
(control group) before and after policy implementation among Medicare patients. We also 
examined whether the policy had different effects in certain subgroups (i.e., between patients 
with and without surgical complications). 
Design: Propensity score-weighted difference-in-differences analysis of hospital stays with 
associated primary surgical procedures to compare changes in outcomes for the treatment and 
control groups before and after HAC-POA policy implementation. Analyses adjusted for patient 
characteristics, Elixhauser comorbidities, hospital characteristics, and indicators for procedure 
type, hospital, and year. We also conducted difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis to 
evaluate whether the HAC-POA policy affected certain subgroups differently.  
Setting: Inpatient surgical care stays at hospitals in the United States.  
Participants: We used the National Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project data from the fourth quarter of 2004 through the third quarter of 2015. The sample 
 73 
consists of 1,092,840 episodes of inpatient surgical care representing 948,519 stays for the 
targeted procedures and 144,321 stays for the nontargeted procedures. 
Exposures: Implementation of the HAC-POA policy. 
Main Outcomes and Measures: Changes in the incidence of SSI and DVT, length of stay, in-
hospital mortality, and hospital costs, comparing surgical patients receiving the targeted 
procedures of the HAC-POA policy to the nontargeted procedures, adjusting for patient 
characteristics, comorbidities, hospital characteristics, procedure type, and year.  
Results: After implementation of the HAC-POA policy, the incidence of SSI in the targeted 
procedures decreased significantly by 0.3 percentage points (95% CI, -0.6 to -0.03; P = 0.02) 
compared to nontargeted procedures. The policy was also associated with a significant reduction 
in length of stay by 0.3 days (95% CI, -0.4 to -0.2; P < 0.001) and hospital costs by 7.7% (95% 
CI, -9.5 to -5.8; P<0.001). We found no significant changes in the incidence of DVT (-0.02 
percentage points; 95% CI, -0.2 to 0.1; P = 0.79) and mortality (-0.01 percentage points; 95% CI, 
-0.1 to 0.1; P = 0.85). We did not find evidence that the HAC-POA policy inversely affected 
patients with surgical complications compared to those without surgical complications in 
mortality, LOS, and hospital costs. 
Conclusions and Relevance: The HAC-POA policy was associated with decreased surgical site 
infection, length of stay, and hospital costs. Policymakers should consider these findings when 
evaluating the continuation and expansion of this program for other surgical procedures. Other 
payers also may want to consider implementing a similar policy. Evaluation of unintended 
consequences is warranted for certain groups of patients, hospitals, or nontargeted procedures. 
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Introduction 
Surgical care comprises 30% of hospital admissions and half of overall hospital costs.1 In 
particular, surgical complications, defined as the adverse and unintended results of surgery,2 
increase hospital costs by approximately $20,000 per admission on average,3 and extend hospital 
stays by 9.7 days.4 Improving surgical care quality and reducing costs are critical for patients, 
healthcare providers, hospitals, and payers. 
In 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the 
Hospital Acquired Condition-Present on Admission (HAC-POA) policy to reduce high-cost 
and/or high-volume complications among Medicare patients, and it remains in effect today. This 
mandatory pay-for-performance (P4P) policy penalizes hospitals by no longer paying for the 
treatment of preventable complications developed during a patient’s hospitalization. The HAC-
POA policy targets 14 selected conditions, six of which are directly related to surgery. Those 
conditions are: foreign objects retained after surgery, surgical site infection (SSI) following 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), cardiac implantable electronic device (CIED), bariatric 
surgery, certain orthopedic procedures, and deep vein thrombosis (DVT) or pulmonary embolism 
(PE) following certain orthopedic procedures. Although it has been 10 years since the HAC-POA 
policy was implemented, little is known about the effect of this policy on improving surgical care 
outcomes. Two studies examined surgical outcomes associated with the HAC-POA policy,5,6  but 
neither evaluated the effects over the long term or employed a control group to compare with the 
targeted procedures. 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the effect of the HAC-POA policy on surgical care 
quality and costs. We addressed three questions: First, did the HAC-POA policy lead to 
decreased surgical complications – SSI and DVT – among Medicare patients who underwent 
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HAC-POA policy-targeted surgical procedures relative to nontargeted procedures? Second, if 
surgical complications decreased, did length of stay (LOS), mortality, and hospital costs also 
decrease? Third, was the HAC-POA policy linked to decreases in LOS, mortality, or hospital 
costs for patients without surgical complications compared to those with surgical complications? 
 
Methods 
Data and Study Population 
We used the National Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
(HCUP) from the fourth quarter of 2004 through the third quarter of 2015 to examine the impact 
of the HAC-POA policy on the incidence of SSI and DVT, LOS, mortality, and hospital costs. 
The unit of analysis was an episode of inpatient surgical care, defined as the hospital stay with its 
accompanying events related to the primary surgical procedure. We identified the primary 
surgical procedure using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) 
procedural codes. Our sample consists of 1,092,840 episodes of Medicare-covered inpatient 
surgical care, representing 948,519 stays for the targeted procedures, and 144,321 stays for the 
nontargeted procedures. 
We excluded inpatient stays from analysis which involved any of the following criteria: 
(1) maternal or neonatal inpatient services because the risk of complications may differ from that 
of the other populations due to the difference in physiology and the treatment management;7–10 
(2) the observations contained missing information regarding key variables; (3) inpatients 
transferred in from other facilities;11 (4) observations with surgical complications as the first 
diagnosis (we assumed they were pre-existing conditions present upon admission, thus not 
related to the procedure performed during the admission;12 (5) hospitals with fewer than 30 
 76 
observations for each procedure to avoid unstable estimates due to small sample size.;13 and (6) 
stays not paid under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), and not subject to the 
HAC-POA policy (e.g., hospital stays at critical access hospitals).14 This study was exempt from 
full review and approved by the University of California San Francisco institutional review 
board. 
Targeted vs. Nontargeted Surgical Procedures 
We used selected surgical procedures not targeted by the HAC-POA policy as a control 
group from hospitals that performed both the targeted and nontargeted procedures. Changes in 
the outcomes might be due to certain unobserved factors, such as electronic records used to 
enhance care process and other policy efforts to improve quality, not necessarily due to the 
policy. By comparing outcomes between the targeted and nontargeted procedures, the influences 
of certain potential confounders are removed. In other words, we use the nontargeted procedure 
group (henceforth “control group) as the counterfactual, which indicates what would have 
happened to the targeted procedure group (henceforth “treatment group”) without the policy.15 
We excluded CABG from the targeted procedures in order to ensure that the policy started at the 
same time for all treated procedures. CABG was included in the beginning of the HAC-POA 
policy implementation (2008), whereas other procedures were included a year later (2009). 
CABG was also targeted by other P4P programs (e.g., the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration), in which case an effect might be observed from a P4P program other than the 
HAC-POA policy. The control group was selected from Medicare patients not affected by the 
CMS policy. We did not select a control group with the same targeted surgical procedures of 
other payers because other payers tend to implement the same P4P programs.16,17 We selected 
cholecystectomy and appendectomy as control groups because these procedures are high in 
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volume, involved different parts of the body, and were not affected by spillovers from targeted 
procedures, which was evaluated by testing whether there was a change in outcomes in these 
surgical procedures at the time of the HAC-POA policy implementation.18,19 Details of the 
criteria to select nontargeted procedures are described in the Appendix Study Methods. 
Outcomes 
The main outcome of this study was the incidence of surgical complications – SSI and 
DVT, measured dichotomously by using ICD-9 codes (Appendix Table 3.1). Surgical 
complications included SSIs following cardiac (implantable electronic devices), orthopedic 
(spine, neck, shoulder, and elbow), obesity-related bariatric procedures, cholecystectomy and 
appendectomy, and DVT/pulmonary embolism following total knee replacement, total hip 
replacement, cholecystectomy and appendectomy. Secondary outcomes included: LOS, 
mortality, and hospital costs. Although these outcomes are not targeted by the policy, we used 
them in this study because the HAC-POA policy designed to improve the targeted clinical 
outcomes might also reduce morbidity and mortality and shorten LOS,20 as examined in other 
studies.21–24 LOS was measured for in-hospital stays related to the procedure. Mortality was 
defined as in-hospital mortality if a particular surgical procedure and in-hospital death were 
reported. Hospital costs were measured continuously by multiplying the total charges by the 
hospital-specific cost-to-charge ratios. The HCUP provides the hospital charges of each inpatient 
stay and the hospital-specific cost-to-charge ratio, which is cost divided by the charges at the 
hospital level. We adjusted for inflation using the personal consumption expenditures health-by-
function index,25 shown to be the most appropriate for adjusting health expenditures for 
inflation.26 
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Statistical Analysis 
To examine the impact of the HAC-POA policy, we performed a propensity score-
weighted difference-in-differences analysis.27  
First, we estimated the propensity score weights for the four groups (the pre-policy 
treatment group, the post-policy treatment group, the pre-policy control group, and the post-
policy control group)27 because there were substantial pre-policy imbalances in the unweighted 
sample (Appendix Table 3.2 and Appendix Study Methods).  
We then compared the characteristics, weighted by propensity score, of the inpatient 
stays of the three groups (the post-policy treatment group, the pre-policy control group, and the 
post-policy control group) to the pre-policy treatment group using a standardized difference in 
means (Appendix Study Methods).28  
To investigate the association between the HAC-POA policy and surgical patients’ 
outcomes, we used a difference-in-differences analysis, a statistical technique that compares 
changes in an outcome for the targeted and nontargeted groups before and after the policy 
implementation (Appendix Study Methods). Difference-in-differences analysis removes any bias 
from the observed and time-invariant unobserved confounders and thus enables us to isolate the 
effect of the policy.29,30 Although the HAC-POA was launched in FY 2008 for some procedures, 
we considered the implementation of this policy to be the fourth quarter of 2009, which is the 
first period that the CMS included the treatment group of this study for the penalty payment. 
Separate models were estimated for each complication (SSI and DVT). We estimated linear 
probability models because linear models provide unbiased and consistent estimation with fixed 
effects.31,32 To estimate hospital costs, ordinary least squares regression with a log-transformed 
cost outcome was used. LOS was analyzed using negative binomial regression to account for 
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overdispersion. All models controlled for patient characteristics (race 
[white/black/Hispanic/Asian/other], gender [female/male], age [years], median household 
income for patient’s zip code by quartile, and 29 indicators from the modified Elixhauser 
comorbidity index), hospital characteristics (bed size [small/medium/large], ownership 
[public/private], location and teaching status [rural teaching and non-teaching/urban non-
teaching/urban teaching], and the natural log of the surgical volume for each hospital), type of 
admission [elective/non-elective]), and indicators for procedure types, years, and hospitals.. 
We also investigated whether the policy differentially affected certain subgroups. We 
tested whether there was a contrasting association between policy and secondary outcomes 
among patients with and without surgical complications. We ran separate linear probability 
models, including a three-way interaction between the difference-in-differences estimator (the 
policy indicator × the post-policy indicator) and the subgroup indicator for these supplementary 
analyses (Appendix Study Methods). 
Hospital-level cluster-robust standard errors were estimated to account for patient 
clustering within hospitals. We applied survey weights losito obtain nationally representative 
estimates and account for the complex survey designs. All statistical tests were 2-sided using a 
significance level of P<0.05, and were performed using Stata MP version 15.1 (StataCorp).  
Sensitivity Analyses 
We performed a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of results across 
model specifications. These comprised models using logistic regression; placebo difference-in-
differences models with a binary placebo P4P indicator to denote that the HAC-POA policy 
would be implemented a year before; models with time trends using group-specific pre-
intervention indicator variables; models evaluating the policy effect on an expanded targeted 
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group; models using a different control group; a one-part generalized linear model (GLM) with 
gamma distribution and log link to model the hospital costs; and propensity score-unweighted 
models. Details of the sensitivity analyses are provided in the Appendix Study Methods. 
 
Results 
Characteristics of Hospital Discharges 
Table 3.1 shows that propensity score-weighted characteristics of the study population 
were largely similar across the four groups.  
Relationship between the HAC-POA Policy and Surgical Outcomes 
The unadjusted rates of surgical outcomes in the treatment and control groups are shown 
in Table 3.2. The risk-adjusted incidence rates of SSI and DVT improved in the treatment group 
a few years after the HAC-POA policy implementation (Figure 1). In the control group, the 
incidence of SSI worsened in 2008, then plateaued, while the incidence of DVT decreased. The 
risk-adjusted secondary outcomes (LOS, mortality, and hospital costs) worsened in 2008 in both 
the treatment and control groups; LOS declined in both the treatment and control groups starting 
in 2012, but declined slightly more in the treatment group, whereas hospital costs declined in the 
treatment group starting in 2012 but remained flat in the control group. 
Table 3.3 shows propensity score-weighted difference-in-differences estimates for each 
of the study outcomes. The estimates – comparing the changes in the outcomes from the pre-
policy period to the post-policy period between the treatment and control groups – indicated that 
the HAC-POA policy was associated with a significant decrease in the incidence of SSI of 0.3 
percentage points (95% CI, -0.6 to -0.03; P=0.02). While not statistically significant, the HAC-
POA policy was also associated with a reduction in the incidence of DVT of 0.02 percentage 
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points (95% CI, -0.2 to 0.1; P=0.79). The HAC-POA policy was also associated with a 
significant reduction in LOS of 0.3 days (95% CI, -0.4 to -0.2; P<0.001). The HAC-POA policy 
was, however, not associated with a significant change in mortality (-0.01 percentage points; 
95% CI, -0.1 to 0.1; P=0.85). Estimated average marginal effects from logistic regression models 
were nearly identical to the results from the linear probability model (Appendix Table 3.3). The 
ordinary least squares regression with a log-transformed cost model estimated a significant 
reduction of hospital costs (-7.7%; 95% CI, -9.5 to -5.8; P<0.001). Considering that the risk-
adjusted average hospital cost of the targeted procedures before the policy implementation was 
approximately $22,900, a hospital costs reduction of 7.7% would be a decrease in hospital costs 
of $1763 ($22900 x 0.077=$1763).  
Based on the difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis, we did not find a 
significantly different link between the treatment and control groups with and without surgical 
complications before and after the commencement of the policy in mortality, LOS, and hospital 
costs (Appendix Table 3.4). 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We tested for a placebo effect of the policy and found no association between the placebo 
policy variable and the improvement in surgical outcomes, which indicates the robustness of our 
results. We found consistent results in SSI, LOS, and hospital costs between the models with and 
without group-specific time trends. We also found a similar effect of the policy for the extended 
target group – venous catheterization. While not statistically significant, the policy was 
associated with a decreased incidence of complication (iatrogenic pneumothorax). Reductions in 
LOS and hospital costs were significant, consistent with the main analyses (Appendix Table 3.5). 
An explanation for the inconsistent statistical significance of the complication result may be due 
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to evaluating this extended target group only one year after the policy implementation. With 
respect to the sensitivity analysis using colon surgery as an alternative control group, we 
observed consistent, but larger, improvements in outcomes related to the HAC-POA policy 
(Appendix Table 3.6). Hospital costs analysis using the GLM model also indicated a significant 
reduction of hospital costs (-$2705; 95% CI, -$3537 to -$1874; P<0.001). Propensity score-
unweighted results were consistent but larger in effect across all the study outcomes (Appendix 
Table 3.7).   
 
Discussion 
Our results of the effect of a mandated, national P4P program show small but significant 
improvements in several dimensions of surgical care. The incidence of SSI, one of the outcomes 
for which hospitals got penalized following the HAC-POA policy implementation, significantly 
decreased, while a decline in incidences of DVT was not significant. We also observed a 
significant reduction in LOS and hospital costs, likely due to a decrease in the incidence of SSI. 
However, we did not find evidence of a significant association between the HAC-POA policy 
and in-hospital mortality. We also found no evidence that the HAC-POA policy negatively 
impacted patients with surgical complications compared to patients without surgical 
complications. 
Our results are consistent with a study by Healy and Cromwell indicating that the HAC-
POA policy was associated with decreased incidence of SSI.5 However, Healy and Cromwell 
adopted a simpler study design (pre- and post-comparison without the control group) that did not 
allow the authors to draw inferences about whether the improved outcomes were related to the 
policy or a secular trend. They also evaluated the policy for a shorter period (the year that policy 
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was implemented and two years after). Using a difference-in-differences estimator over 10 years 
of data, we found a significant association between the HAC-POA policy and decreased 
incidence of SSI for patients who underwent the targeted procedures compared to patients 
undergoing procedures not targeted. Inconsistency in the statistical significance regarding the 
incidence of DVT between this study and the Healy and Cromwell study may indicate that the 
decreased incidence of DVT that they observed over 3 years might have been due to a secular 
trend.  
Limited research has evaluated the long-term effects of P4P programs, and it may take 
years for hospitals to change their practices to improve quality of care.22 Our study provides new 
evidence on the long-term effect of the HAC-POA for surgical care that has not been evaluated 
previously. We found that the incidence of SSI did not significantly drop until 2014, five years 
after the policy implementation. This suggests the importance of long-term assessment, as 
quality improvement in response to P4P requires time, resources to support infrastructure, and 
expertise from groups of providers including surgeons, nurses, and other specialists. This could 
also indicate that hospitals were still learning the skills required to identify, monitor, and report 
SSIs.33 We did not find that the HAC-POA policy was associated with reduced mortality even 
after 6 years, consistent with prior evidence under a different P4P program.22 Although the HAC-
POA policy improved more proximal clinical outcomes,34 it is unlikely that it would have 
reduced mortality, because mortality is difficult to improve.35 
Our results extend prior research, indicating that a P4P program utilizing penalty design 
can improve surgical outcomes.36 While our study and Borza et al. study36 did not evaluate the 
same P4P program, both studies examined the long-term trend and found positive effects of the 
P4P programs for surgical care. Further study is needed to investigate whether different P4P 
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programs have heterogeneous effects and what drives the differences, if any exist (e.g., P4P 
designs, duration of implementation, surgical procedures).  
P4P programs are intended to improve outcomes at reduced costs, but concerns exist over 
instituting the systems to monitor quality, as implementing interventions to improve quality in 
response to P4P are resource- and time-consuming tasks for hospitals.37,38 We observed 
increased hospital costs for 4 years for patient stays associated with the targeted procedures: the 
year before the targeted procedures were subject to penalties, the policy implementation year, 
and the 2 years following policy implementation. The P4P policy could have widened the quality 
differences for hospitals that lack resources for quality of care improvements. Future research 
may evaluate whether the effect of P4P programs substantially differ between certain groups of 
hospitals (e.g., minority-serving or low-income-serving hospitals).  
Despite the potential for quality improvement related to P4P, researchers have raised 
concerns about its unintended consequences.39–42 We examined whether patients without surgical 
complications experienced increased hospital costs due to policy implementation costs and found 
no significant changes. However, we found some evidence of spillover effects for Medicare 
patients receiving nontargeted procedures, consistent with a previous study.36 The incidence of 
SSI and hospital costs increased a year before the policy implementation, and then remained 
relatively stable in the nontargeted procedures. This might suggest that hospitals made an effort 
to improve the quality of targeted procedures to avoid penalties, but possibly at the expense of 
resources for the nontargeted procedures.36 An alternative explanation is that hospitals and 
providers lacked the motivation to improve the quality of nontargeted procedures because they 
are still paid for treating complications without penalties. It may also indicate heterogeneity in 
surgical procedures.36 A quality improvement intervention for a specific surgical procedure may 
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not be effective for other surgical procedures.36 To further improve the quality of surgical care, 
expansion of the P4P program might be warranted for other surgeries. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations in our study including a possible overestimation of the effect 
of the policy due to undetected or underreported surgical complications. The data used for this 
study only captured SSIs detected during hospitalization and may not account for those 
developing after discharge.12 Thus, it is likely that the incidence of SSI is higher than we 
observed in this study. However, if the rates of missed SSIs are similar between the targeted and 
the nontargeted procedures, these missing SSIs would not bias the result. Second, pre-
intervention trends were significantly different in three of the outcomes. To address this issue, 
we performed a difference-in-differences analysis including group-specific time trends and 
checked the robustness of the results.19,43 Third, the difference-in-differences model is 
susceptible to unobserved time-varying confounders. For example, unobserved motivations to 
improve the quality may differ between the targeted and the nontargeted procedures. We applied 
propensity score weights to analyze all outcomes, which may have limited any effect of 
unobserved time-varying confounders. Fourth, while we excluded stays from hospitals that were 
not affected by the HAC-POA policy, we were unable to identify those hospitals after 2012 
because of the dataset’s limitations. This misidentification could have attenuated the results. 
However, we repeated the main analyses after excluding hospitals with small numbers of beds 
(critical access hospitals that were not subject to the HAC-POA policy, with fewer than 25 
hospital beds) and found identical results. Fifth, not measuring hospital costs related to setting up 
and managing interventions to improve quality may lead to an underestimation of total costs. 
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Hospital payments are also specific to the service and payer; thus, a hospital-specific cost-to-
charge ratio may be a biased reflection of a specific service’s true cost. 
Implications 
These findings have important implications. First, we found evidence of improved 
surgical care related to the P4P program utilizing a penalty design. Although the evidence on the 
effects of P4P on improved quality and cost is mixed, penalties have recently become popular in 
P4P programs. This might be because penalty strategies are more likely to change behavior than 
rewards because providers and hospitals may be more responsive to losses than gains.44 The 
incidence of surgical complication is small but the cost is still high, thus hospitals and providers 
might be more motivated to improve the quality in response to the threat of penalties. While our 
findings suggest that a P4P program can result in a positive impact on surgical care, more 
research is needed to confirm our findings.  
Negative effects of P4P programs should also be examined. Hospitals serving a 
disproportionate number of vulnerable patients may be more likely to be penalized and 
financially compromised. Some hospitals may reject high-risk patients or change coding 
practices so as not to report complications. No improvement or worsened outcomes in the 
nontargeted procedures may also occur. 
Conclusions 
Our study suggests that the HAC-POA policy has had a positive impact on surgical care. 
It is possible hospitals may have been motivated to avoid the penalties of this policy, which has 
led to improvement in certain surgical outcomes. Policy makers should consider these findings 
when evaluating the continuation and expansion of this program for CMS. Other payers also may 
want to consider implementing similar policies. 
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Table 3.1. Propensity Score-Weighted Characteristics of Hospital Staysa for the Four Groupsb:  
The Pre-Policy Treatment Group (n=194 076), the Post-Policy Treatment Group (n=754 443), 
the Pre-Policy Control Group (n=37 699), and the Post-Policy Control Group (n=106 622) 
 
     Weighted Standardized 
Difference in Means 
Characteristics T Pre T Post C Pre C Post 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
C Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
Gender, %        
   Male 39.4 39.4 38.9 39.9 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Female 60.6 60.6 61.1 60.1 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Race/ethnicity, %        
White 88.7 88.2 88.5 87.7 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Black 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.01 0.01 0.00 
   Hispanic 3.8 4.1 3.8 4.4 0.01 -0.00 0.02 
Asian/Pacific Islander 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 0.00   
Others 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 
Age, mean (SD), years 75.5 (0.05) 
74.7 
(0.04) 
75.5 
(0.05) 
75.3 
(0.05) -0.11 -0.00 -0.02 
Median Income Quartile, %        
0-25th percentile 22.8 25.0 22.0 24.1 0.05 -0.02 0.03 
26-50th percentile 27.2 28.3 27.0 28.8 0.02 -0.00 0.03 
51-75th percentile 26.0 25.2 26.5 25.8 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
76-100th percentile 23.9 21.5 24.6 21.3 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 
Elixhauser Comorbidity 
Index, %        
AIDS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Alcohol abuse 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Anemia 13.9 14.9 13.4 13.6 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
Rheumatoid arthritis 
/Collagen Vascular 
Disease 
3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 -0.00 0.01 0.00 
Chronic blood loss anemia 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 
Congestive heart failure 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Chronic pulmonary disease 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.8 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Coagulopathy 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Depression 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.2 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Diabetes, uncomplicated 18.6 18.8 18.7 18.6 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
Diabetes with chronic 
complications 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Drug abuse 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Hypertension 68.0 68.0 68.5 67.7 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Hypothyroidism 15.3 15.3 15.6 15.5 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
Liver disease 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Lymphoma 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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     Weighted Standardized 
Difference in Means 
Characteristics T Pre T Post C Pre C Post 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
C Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
Fluid and electrolyte 
disorders 10.2 10.7 10.3 11.1 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Metastatic cancer 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Neurological disorders 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Obesity 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.4 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Paralysis 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.2 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Psychoses 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
Pulmonary circulation 
disorders 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Renal failure 4.4 4.6 4.6 5.1 0.01 0.01 0.03 
   Solid tumor without 
   metastasis 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 -0.00 0.00 0.02 
   Peptic ulcer disease    
   excluding bleeding  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
   Valvular disease 5.0 4.9 5.4 5.0 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 
Weight loss 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Location and Teaching 
Status, %        
Rural 7.4 8.3 6.9 8.3 0.04 -0.02 0.03 
Urban, non  
Teaching 53.0 58.9 52.1 59.0 0.12 -0.02 0.12 
   Urban, teaching 39.6 32.7 41.0 32.7 -0.14 0.03 -0.14 
Ownership, %        
Government 47.3 49.4 51.2 46.9 0.04 0.07 -0.01 
Private 52.7 50.6 48.8 53.1 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 
Bed Size, %        
Small 12.6 11.8 12.6 12.5 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 
Medium 23.0 22.3 23.2 23.2 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
Large 64.5 66.0 64.2 64.3 0.04 -0.01 0.01 
Abbreviations: T = Treatment group; C = Control group; Pre = Pre-policy period (before the 
third quarter of 2008); Post = Post-policy period (after the third quarter of 2008) 
 
a Rows may not add up to 100%, due to rounding.  
b A treatment group includes patients who underwent the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures 
(cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, 
and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). A control group includes 
patients who underwent an appendectomy and a cholecystectomy. 
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Table 3.2. Propensity Score-Weighted Unadjusted Surgical Complication Rates, Length of Stay, 
and Hospital Costs Before and After the HAC-POA Policy Implementation for Hospital Stays 
for Treatment Groupa and Control Groupb 
 
 
 
Outcome 
 
Pre Policy Period 
(2005-2008) 
Post Policy 
Period 
(2009-2015) 
Unadjusted 
Difference-in-
Differences Estimatec  
Surgical Complications, No. of Events/ No. of Patients (%) 
SSI    
Treatment Group 453/37 699 
(1.02) 
2061/106 622 
(1.31) 
 
-0.3** 
(-0.5 to -0.1) Control Group 169/44 584  
(0.37) 
636/159 984 
(0.35) 
DVT    
Treatment Group 187/37 699 
(0.48) 
590/106 622 
(0.32) -0.03 
(-0.2 to 0.1) Control Group 1078/149 492 
(0.71) 
4137/594 459 
(0.53) 
Mortality No. of Events/ No. of Patients (%) 
Treatment Group 274/37 699 
(0.46) 
1244/106 622 
(0.56) -0.08 
(-0.2 to 0.02) Control Group 681/194 076 
(0.35) 
3189/754 443 
(0.37) 
Length of Stay, mean (SD), days 
Treatment Group 4.5  
(0.05) 
4.6  
(0.03) 
 
-0.45*** 
(-0.52 to -0.39) Control Group 4.0  
(0.03) 
3.7  
(0.02) 
Hospital Costs, mean (SD),e $ 
Treatment Group 14 440.3  
(179.5) 
15 129.7  
(193.3) 
 
- 2086.5*** 
(-2293.5 to -1879.5) Control Group 22 938.4  
(310.9) 
21 541.4  
(267.4) 
Abbreviations: HAC-POA, Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; 
SSI, Surgical Site Infection; DVT, Deep Vein Thrombosis; CI, Confidence Interval 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value. **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001 
 
a The treatment group includes patients who underwent the HAC-POA policy’s targeted 
procedures (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, 
total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). 
b The control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a cholecystectomy. 
c The unadjusted difference-in-differences estimate is a propensity score-weighted unadjusted    
  differential effect of the policy between the treatment group and control group before and after  
 90 
  the policy implementation. Estimates for SSI, DVT, and mortality are predicted probability 
changes in percentage points. Estimates for length of stay are changes in days. Estimates for 
hospital costs are changes in dollars.  
e Inflation is adjusted using the personal consumption expenditures health-by-function index for    
  the 2015 dollar value. 
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Table 3.3. Propensity Score-Weighted Estimatesa of the Associations between the HAC-POA 
Policy and Surgical Outcomes 
 
Outcome 
Pre-Post Difference 
in Treatment Groupb 
Pre-Post Difference 
in Control Groupc 
Difference-in-
Differences 
Estimated  
SSI -0.08 
(-0.48 to 0.31) 
0.20 
(-0.16 to 0.57) 
-0.29** 
(-0.55 to -0.02) 
DVT 0.003 
(-0.24 to 0.25) 
0.03 
(-0.23 to 0.28) 
-0.02 
(-0.18 to 0.13) 
Length of Stay -0.58 
(-0.70 to -0.47) 
-0.25 
(-0.39 to -0.10) 
-0.34*** 
(-0.44 to -0.23) 
Mortality 0.06 
(-0.09 to 0.21) 
0.08 
(-0.09 to 0.24) 
-0.01 
(-0.1 to 0.1) 
Hospital Costs -2.17 
(-5.82 to 1.51) 
5.92 
(2.12 to 9.86) 
-7.69*** 
(-9.5 to -5.8) 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value; *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.001 
 
a Estimates for SSI, DVT, and mortality are predicted probability changes in percentage points. 
Estimates for length of stay are changes in days. Estimates for hospital costs are changes in 
percentage.  
b The difference in the treatment group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period for patients in the treatment 
group (i.e., cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, 
total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures).  
c The difference in the control group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period among patients in the control 
group (i.e., cholecystectomy and appendectomy). 
d Difference-in-differences estimate is a propensity score-weighted adjusted differential effect of 
the policy between the treatment group and control group before and after the policy 
implementation. For example, the SSI among patients in the treatment group decreased 0.3 
percentage points after the policy implementation compared with pre-policy relative to the 
control group, and the difference was significant. Length of stay among patients in the 
treatment group decreased by 0.3 days in the post-policy period compared with the pre-policy 
period, relative to the control group. 
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Appendix Table 3.1 ICD-9-CM Codes for Defining the Sample  
 
Procedure 
ICD-9-CM 
Procedural Code Outcome 
ICD-9-CM 
Diagnostic 
Code 
Years 
included 
in the 
CMS P4P 
CMS P4P Target Procedures (P4P Treatment group) 
Cardiac Implantable  
Electronic Device  
00.50, 00.51, 00.52, 
00.53, 00.54, 37.80, 
37.81, 37.82, 37.83, 
37.85, 37.86, 37.87, 
37.94, 37.96, 37.98, 
37.74, 37.75, 37.76, 
37.77, 37.79, 37.89 
Surgical Site 
Infection 
 
996.61, 
998.59 
 
FY 2009 
Certain Orthopedic 
Procedures  
(Spine/Neck/Shoulder 
/Ankle) 
81.01-81.08, 81.23, 
81.24, 81.31-81.38, 
81.83, 81.85  
Surgical Site 
Infection 
996.67, 
998.59 
 
FY 2009 
Bariatric Surgery  
for Obesity 44.38, 44.39, 44.95  
 
Surgical Site 
Infection  
 
278.01  & 
(one of the 
following: 
539.01, 
539.81, 
998.59) 
FY 2009 
Certain Orthopedic 
Procedures  
(Total Knee 
Arthroplasty 
/Total Hip 
Arthroplasty) 
00.85-00.87, 81.51-
81.52, or 81.54 
Deep Vein 
Thrombosis 
415.11, 
415.13, 
415.19, 
453.40-
453.42 
FY 2009 
CMS P4P Non-Target Procedures (P4P Control group) 
Cholecystectomy  
 
51.21, 51.22 (Open); 
51.23, 51.24 
(Laparoscopic) 
 
 
Surgical Site 
Infection 
567, 567.2, 
567.21, 
567.22, 
567.23, 
567.29, 
567.3, 
567.38, 
567.39, 
567.8, 
567.81, 
567.89, 
567.9, 682.2 
 
  Deep Vein Thrombosis 
415.11, 
415.13,  
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Procedure 
ICD-9-CM 
Procedural Code Outcome 
ICD-9-CM 
Diagnostic 
Code 
Years 
included 
in the 
CMS P4P 
415.19, 
453.40-
453.42 
Appendectomy 
47.01 
(Laparoscopic); 
47.09 
(Open) 
 
Surgical Site 
Infection 
567, 567.2, 
567.21, 
567.22, 
567.23, 
567.29, 
567.3, 
567.38, 
567.39, 
567.8, 
567.81, 
567.89, 
567.9, 682.2 
 
  Deep Vein Thrombosis 
415.11, 
415.13, 
415.19, 
453.40-
453.42 
 
Control Group for Sensitivity Analysis 
Venous Catheterization  38.93 Iatrogenic Pneumothorax 512.1 FY 2014 
Colon Surgery 
45.03, 45.26, 45.41, 
45.49, 45.52, 45.71, 
45.72, 45.73, 45.74, 
45.75, 45.76, 45.79, 
45.82, 45.83, 46.03, 
46.04, 46.10, 46.11, 
46.13, 46.14, 46.43, 
46.52, 46.75, 46.76, 
45.92, 45.93, 45.94, 
45.95, 46.94 (Open); 
45.81, 17.31, 17.32, 
17.33, 17.34, 17.35, 
17.36, 17.39 
(Laparoscopic) 
Surgical Site 
Infection  
 
567, 567.2, 
567.21, 
567.22, 
567.23, 
567.29, 
567.3, 
567.38, 
567.39, 
567.8, 
567.81, 
567.89, 
567.9, 682.2 
 
  Deep Vein Thrombosis 
415.11, 
415.13, 
415.19, 
453.40-
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Procedure 
ICD-9-CM 
Procedural Code Outcome 
ICD-9-CM 
Diagnostic 
Code 
Years 
included 
in the 
CMS P4P 
453.42 
 
Abbreviations: ICD-9-CM: International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification; CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid; P4P: pay-for-performance 
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Appendix Table 3.2 Propensity Score-Unweighteda Characteristics of Hospital Stays for the 
Four Groupsb: the Pre-Policy Treatment Group, the Post-Policy Treatment Group, the Pre-Policy 
Control Group, and the Post-Policy Control Group 
 
     Weighted Standardized 
Difference in Means 
 T Pre T Post C Pre C Post 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
C Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
Gender, %        
   Male 39.4 38.1 43.9 47.5 -0.03 0.09 0.16 
Female 60.6 61.9 56.1 52.5 0.03 -0.09 -0.16 
Race/ethnicity, %        
White 88.7 87.0 81.8 79.0 -0.04 -0.19 -0.26 
Black 4.2 5.3 5.1 6.4 0.05 0.04 0.10 
   Hispanic 3.8 4.1 7.8 9.4 0.01 0.17 0.22 
Asian/Pacific Islander 1.2 1.1 2.7 2.6 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Others 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.6 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Age, mean (SD), years 75.5 (0.05) 
74.7 
(0.04) 
75.6 
(0.05) 
75.7 
(0.05) -0.11 0.00 0.03 
Median Income Quartile, %        
0-25th percentile 22.8 22.8 25.3 25.7 0.00 0.06 0.07 
26-50th percentile 27.2 26.7 25.6 25.9 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
51-75th percentile 26.0 26.3 25.2 25.5 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
76-100th percentile 23.9 24.2 23.8 22.8 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 
Elixhauser Comorbidity 
Index, %        
Acquired Immune 
Deficiency syndrome 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Alcohol abuse 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.04 0.03 0.09 
Anemia 13.9 14.4 10.1 15.8 0.01 -0.12 0.05 
Rheumatoid arthritis 
/Collagen Vascular Disease 3.1 4.1 2.3 2.9 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 
Chronic blood loss anemia 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.6 -0.00 -0.10 -0.08 
Congestive heart failure 4.6 5.0 9.3 11.6 0.02 0.19 0.26 
Chronic pulmonary disease 15.1 16.3 17.7 18.6 0.03 0.07 0.09 
Coagulopathy 1.8 3.3 2.1 5.0 0.10 0.02 0.18 
Depression 7.4 11.5 5.6 8.1 0.14 -0.08 0.02 
Diabetes, uncomplicated 18.6 20.8 22.0 25.6 0.06 0.09 0.17 
Diabetes with chronic 
complications 1.5 2.2 2.1 3.6 0.05 0.04 0.13 
Drug abuse 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.04 0.00 0.05 
Hypertension 68.0 72.8 66.9 73.7 0.11 -0.02 0.12 
Hypothyroidism 15.3 18.3 13.1 15.9 0.08 -0.06 0.01 
Liver disease 0.5 0.8 2.9 4.7 0.04 0.19 0.27 
  
99 
     Weighted Standardized 
Difference in Means 
 T Pre T Post C Pre C Post 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
C Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
T Post 
vs. 
T Pre 
Lymphoma 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Fluid and electrolyte 
disorders 10.2 13.3 19.6 29.1 0.10 0.27 0.49 
Metastatic cancer 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.5 0.01 0.09 0.11 
Neurological disorders 5.3 6.3 5.0 6.2 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Obesity 7.6 13.6 7.0 12.6 0.20 -0.02 0.17 
Paralysis 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.4 0.01 0.04 0.06 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 3.8 4.1 5.5 7.1 0.02 0.08 0.15 
Psychoses 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.8 0.05 0.00 0.06 
Pulmonary circulation 
disorders 1.0 1.7 1.3 2.8 0.07 0.04 0.13 
Renal failure 4.4 8.4 6.0 12.7 0.16 0.07 0.30 
   Solid tumor     
   without  
   metastasis 
0.9 0.8 1.5 1.8 -0.01 0.05 0.08 
   Peptic ulcer 
   disease    
   excluding  
   bleeding 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.00 0.03 0.02 
   Valvular  
   disease 5.0 5.3 6.6 7.3 0.01 0.06 0.09 
Weight loss 0.7 1.3 2.3 5.4 0.06 0.13 0.28 
Location and Teaching 
Status, %        
Rural 7.4 9.4 11.7 10.8 0.08 0.14 0.12 
Urban, non  
teaching 53.0 43.0 57.3 48.6 -0.21 0.08 -0.10 
   Urban, teaching 39.6 47.6 31.0 40.6 0.17 -0.17 0.03 
Ownership, %        
Government 47.3 9.1 44.0 10.0 -0.95 -0.06 -0.92 
Private 52.7 90.9 56.0 90.0 0.95 0.06 0.92 
Bed Size, %        
Small 12.6 17.5 10.3 12.0 0.13 -0.07 -0.03 
Medium 23.0 25.9 24,8 27.8 0.07 0.05 0.11 
Large 64.5 56.6 65.0 60.2 -0.16 0.01 -0.08 
Abbreviations: T = Treatment group; C = Control group; Pre = Pre-policy period (before the 
third quarter of 2008); Post = Post-policy period (after the third quarter of 2008) 
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a Characteristics are not propensity score-weighted, but survey weights are accounted for. Rows 
may not add up to 100%, due to rounding.  
b A treatment group includes patients who underwent the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures 
(cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, 
and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). A control group includes 
patients who underwent an appendectomy and a cholecystectomy. 
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Appendix Table 3.3 Propensity Score-Weighted Predicted Probability Differencesa of the 
Association between the HAC-POA Policy and Surgical Outcomes from the Logistic Regression 
Model 
 
Outcome 
Difference 
in the Treatment Groupb 
Difference 
in the Control Groupc 
Difference-in-
Differences Estimate  
SSI 0.08 (-0.10 to 0.27) 
0.59 
(0.11 to 1.07) 
-0.51** 
(-0.87 to -0.14) 
DVT -0.24 (-0.52 to 0.03) 
-0.16 
(-0.33 to 0.01) 
-0.08 
(-0.28 to 0.12) 
Mortality -0.01 (-0.13 to 0.11) 
0.02 
(-0.17 to 0.21) 
-0.03 
(-0.15 to 0.08) 
Abbreviations: HAC-POA, Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; 
SSI, Surgical Site Infection; DVT, Deep Vein Thrombosis; CI, Confidence Interval 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value. **p < 0.05  
 
a Estimates are predicted probability changes in percentage points.  
b The difference in the treatment group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period for patients in the treatment 
group (i.e., cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, 
total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). 
c The difference in the control group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period among patients in the control 
group (i.e., cholecystectomy and appendectomy). 
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Appendix Table 3.4 Propensity Score-Weighted Estimates of the Association between the 
HAC-POA Policy and Surgical Outcomes in Patients with Surgical Complicationsa vs. Patients 
without Surgical Complications 
 
Outcome 
Difference  
in the Treatment Groupb  
Difference  
in the Control Groupc 
Difference-in-
Difference-in-
Differences 
Estimated  
 
Pre- and 
Post- policy 
changes 
among 
patients  
Without 
surgical 
complicatione 
Pre- and Post- 
policy 
changes 
among 
patients  
With  
surgical 
complicationf 
Pre- and 
Post- policy 
changes 
among 
patient 
Without 
surgical 
complicatiog  
Pre- and Post- 
policy 
changes 
among patient  
With  
surgical 
complicationh  
Length of 
Stay 
-0.58 
(-0.70 to  
-0.47) 
-1.09 
(-1.53 to  
-0.65) 
-0.26 
(-0.41 to  
-0.12) 
-0.12 
(-1.01 to 
0.78) 
-0.65 
(-1.59 to 0.28) 
Mortality 
0.07 
(-0.09 to 
0.22) 
-0.88 
(-2.34 to  
0.58) 
0.09 
(-0.08 to 
0.25) 
-1.10 
(-3.50 to  
1.29) 
0.24 
(-2.56 to 3.04) 
Hospital 
Costs 
-2.23 
(-6.04 to 
1.57) 
-6.63 
(-1.19 to  
-1.41) 
5.67 
(1.94 to  
9.40) 
4.76 
(-3.90 to 
13.41) 
-3.48 
(-12.18 to 5.21) 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses.  
 
a Surgical complications are defined as any of SSI or DVT. 
b A treatment group includes patients who underwent the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures 
(cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, 
and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). 
c A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a cholecystectomy. 
d The difference-in-difference-in-differences estimate is a differential effect of the policy 
between the treatment and the control groups before and after the policy implementation 
(difference-in-differences) across patients with surgical complications vs. no complications. 
Estimates for length of stay are changes in days. Estimates for mortality are predicted 
probability changes in percentage points. Estimates for hospital costs are changes in percentage.  
e The difference in the treatment group without surgical complications is the difference in the 
average marginal effect of the outcome in the treatment group between pre- and post-policy 
implementation among patients without surgical complications (SSI or DVT). 
f The difference in the treatment group with surgical complications is the difference in the 
average marginal effect of the outcome in the treatment group between pre- and post-policy 
implementation among patients with surgical complications. 
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g The difference in the control group without surgical complications is the difference in the 
average marginal effect of the outcome in the control group between pre- and post-policy 
implementation among patients without surgical complications. 
h The difference in the control group with surgical complications is the difference in the average 
marginal effect of the outcome in the control group between pre- and post-policy 
implementation among patients with surgical complications. 
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Appendix Table 3.5 Propensity Score-Weighted Estimatesa of the Association between the 
HAC-POA Policy and Iatrogenic Pneumothorax Following Venous Catheterization 
 
Outcome 
Difference  
in the Treatment Groupb 
Difference  
in the  
Control Groupc 
Difference-in-
Differences Estimate  
Complicationd -0.17  (-0.49 to 0.15) 
-0.13  
(-0.46 to 0.18) 
-0.04  
(-0.15 to 0.08) 
Length of Stay -2.41 (-2.80 to -2.03) 
-2.16  
(-2.54 to -1.78) 
-0.25**  
(-0.44 to -0.06) 
Mortality -2.77  (-5.73to 0.19) 
-2.45 
(-5.51 to 0.61) 
-0.32 
(-1.25 to 0.62) 
Hospital Costs -24.94 (-37.84 to -12.04) 
-24.09  
(-37.08 to -11.10) 
-0.85  
(-2.69 to 1.00) 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value. **p < 0.05  
 
a Estimates for complication (iatrogenic pneumothorax) and mortality are changes in percentage 
points. Estimates for length of stay are changes in days. Estimates for hospital costs are 
changes in percentage. 
b The difference in the treatment group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period for patients with venous 
catheterization covered by Medicare. Venous catheterization became an expanded target 
condition of the HAC-POA policy in FY2013.  
c The difference in the control group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period among venous 
catheterization patients covered by payers other than Medicare or Medicaid.  
d Complication is defined as iatrogenic pneumothorax following venous catheterization. 
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Appendix Table 3.6 Propensity Score-Weighted Estimatesa of the Association between the 
HAC-POA Policy and Surgical Outcomes among Patients who Underwent the Target Surgical 
Procedures and Patients who Underwent Colon Surgery  
 
Outcome 
Difference 
in the Treatment Groupb 
Difference 
in the Control Groupc 
Difference-in-
Differences Estimate  
SSI 1.73  (-0.23 to 3.70) 
5.22 
(3.25 to 7.20) 
-3.49***  
(-4.17 to -2.81) 
DVT -0.15 (-0.48 to 0.18) 
0.05 
(-0.30 to 0.41) 
-0.20**  
(-0.39 to -0.02) 
Length of Stay -0.55  (-0.65 to -0.46) 
-0.17 
(-0.40 to -0.05) 
-0.38***  
(-0.55 to -0.20) 
Mortality -0.19  (-1.13 to 0.75) 
0.86 
(-0.13 to 1.85) 
-1.05***  
(-1.34 to -0.76) 
Hospital Costs -12.41 (-19.82 to -5.00) 
-1.69 
(-9.24 to 5.86) 
-10.72***  
(-12.90 to -8.54) 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value. **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001 
 
a Estimates for SSI, DVT, and mortality are changes in percentage points. Estimates for length of 
stay are changes in days. Estimates for hospital costs are changes in percentage. 
b The difference in the treatment group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period for Medicare patients who 
underwent the targeted procedures of the HAC-POA policy.  
b The difference in the control group is the difference in the average marginal effect of the 
outcome between the pre- and post-policy implementation period among Medicare patients 
who underwent colon surgery. 
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Appendix Table 3.7 Propensity Score-Unweighted Estimatesa of the Association between the 
HAC-POA Policy and Surgical Outcomes 
 
Outcome 
Difference 
in the Treatment Groupb 
Difference 
in the Control Groupb 
Difference-in-
Differences 
Estimate  
SSI 0.30 (0.05 to 0.54) 
0.73 
(0.46 to 1.01) 
-0.44*** 
(-0.63 to -0.25) 
DVT -0.002 (-0.17 to 0.17) 
-0.06 
(-0.25 to 0.17) 
0.05 
(-0.06 to 0.17) 
Length of Stayc -0.78 (-0.89 to -0.67) 
-0.38 
(-0.50 to -0.27) 
-0.40*** 
(-0.49 to -0.31) 
Mortalityc 0.11 (0.004 to 0.21) 
0.15 
(0.001 to 0.29) 
-0.04 
(-0.16 to 0.08) 
Hospital Costsc -1.64 (-4.46 to 1.18) 
10.37 
(7.32 to 13.42) 
-12.01*** 
(-13.73 to -10.28) 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value. **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001  
 
a Estimates are not propensity score-weighted, but survey weights are accounted for. Estimates 
for SSI, DVT, and mortality are predicted probability changes in percentage points. Estimates 
for length of stay are changes in days. Estimates for hospital costs are changes in percentage.  
b A treatment group includes patients who underwent the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures 
(cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, 
and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). 
c A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a cholecystectomy. 
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Appendix Study Methods: 
Selection of a control group 
Following prior research,45 we selected nontargeted surgical procedures for a control 
group based on the following criteria: (a) surgical procedures that have a sufficiently large 
volume; (b) surgical procedures that would not be influenced by spillover effects from the CMS 
P4P policy; and (c) surgical procedures that have a reasonably large number of complications 
(i.e., 2,967 and 278 complications that occurred over the study period of time following 
cholecystectomy and appendectomy, respectively), which thus motivates providers and hospitals 
to improve associated quality of care. To this end, we selected cholecystectomy and 
appendectomy as a control group. 
Difference-in-differences models 
Difference-in-differences is an econometric method to overcome issues with the selection 
on unobservables. Difference-in-differences has been widely used in the evaluation of healthcare 
policies.19 Policy programs rarely select individuals at random. Instead, such programs 
purposefully select the target group.46 Thus, the target group may have different characteristics 
compared with the non-target group. The basic idea of difference-in-differences is that outcomes 
are measured for the treatment group (the group exposed to the intervention) and the control 
group (the group not exposed to the intervention) before and after the intervention. Any 
difference between the two groups in the pre-intervention period and the post-intervention period 
is calculated and defined as a difference-in-differences.19 Difference-in-differences removes the 
biases (1) from the permanent difference between the treatment and control groups due to the 
omitted variables, thus unobservables, and (2) from differences that could have resulted from 
trends,47 if the trends in outcome changes for the treatment and control groups are similar over 
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the two time periods in the absence of the treatment.47 Whether the assumption of difference-in-
differences is violated can be confirmed by testing the significance of the interaction term 
between the linear time trend and the treatment group during the pre-P4P policy period.19  
Applying difference-in-differences in the context of this study, we specified the 
difference-in-differences model at the patient level as follows: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$ = 𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!  + 𝛽! 𝑃!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝛽!𝐻! ++𝛽!𝐼! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝑢!"#$ 
where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$ is the outcome for patient i in hospital j receiving procedure k at time t, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is equal to 1 if the procedure is targeted by the CMS P4P, Post is equal to 1 for after the 
third quarter of 2008, P is a vector of patient characteristics; Z is a vector of hospital 
characteristics; and H, I, and Year are vectors of hospital, procedure and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  
The interaction between P4P and Post is the difference-in-differences estimator. If 𝛽!has 
a negative sign, this would indicate that the CMS P4P has improved surgical outcomes 
(decreased incidence of complications, mortality, length of stay, and hospital costs). 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences models 
We specified our difference-in-difference-in-differences model by entering a triple 
interaction term – Treat × Post × Complication – and estimated the model using the following 
equation to examine whether the policy has had different effects in certain subgroups: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$ = 𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#$ + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!  +𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!× 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#$ + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!× 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑃!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝛽!"𝐻! + 𝛽!!𝐼! + 𝛽!"𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝑢!"#$ 
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In this equation, coefficient β! is a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator for 
patients with surgical complications. The following table shows how the difference-in-
difference-in-differences estimator can be calculated. 
Abbreviation: comp, complication 
Time-varying treatment effects 
We tested whether the pre-trend existed prior to the HAC-POA policy implementation 
using an event study analysis.48 Doing so helped us determine whether unobserved time-varying 
confounding events affected outcomes, which enabled us to validate the robustness of the results. 
Specifically, we estimated the following model: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$ = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝜇!"!!!!! + 𝑃!"# + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝛽!𝐻! ++𝛽!𝐼! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝑢!"#$ 
where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$% for patient i in hospital j receiving procedure k at time t. 𝜇!" is a dummy 
variable indicating that procedure k was displaced m years before or after the policy 
implementation. P is a vector of patient characteristics; Z is a vector of hospital characteristics; 
and H, I, and Year are vectors of hospital, procedure and year fixed effects, respectively.  
 Complication Before P4P After P4P Difference 
Target Complication 𝑂!"#$%!,!"#,!"#$ = B 𝑂!"#$%!,!"#$,!"#$ = A 𝐴 − 𝐵 
NonTarget Complication 𝑂!"!#$%&'#,!"#,!"#$ = D 𝑂!"!#$%&'#,!"#$,!"#$ = C 𝐶 − 𝐷 
Difference-in-differences   (A−B) − (C−D) 
Target No Complication	 𝑂!"#$%!,!"#,!" !"#$ = F 𝑂!"#$%!,!"#$,!" !"#$ = E 𝐸 − 𝐹 
NonTarget No Complication	 𝑂!"!#$%&'#,!"#,!" !"#$ = H	 𝑂!"!#$%&'#,!"#$,!" !"#$ = G 𝐺 − 𝐻 
Difference-in-differences  (E−F) − (G−H) 
Difference-in-difference-
in-differences   
[(A−B) − 
(C−D)] – 
[(E−F) − 
(G−H)] 
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Appendix Figure 3.1 presents changes in the average incidences of complications for the 
4 years before and 6 years after policy implementation. Prior to policy implementation, the 
incidence of SSI increased. However, a year before and after policy implementation, there was a 
small but significant decrease in the incidence of SSI. DVT incidences were unchanged. These 
plots are identical to the results from the DD analysis. However, the decrease in SSI incidence a 
year before policy implementation may indicate that the hospitals might have some knowledge 
of the policy implementation, thus might have altered their behavior in response.  
Appendix Figure 3.1 Event Study Estimates of Impact of the HAC-POA Policy on the 
Incidences of Surgical Site Infection and Deep Vein Thrombosis 
Using propensity score in difference-in-differences 
We used propensity score weighting based on a study that suggested a specific matching 
method for the difference-in-differences design,27 to address the issue that the parallel trend 
assumption was violated for all outcomes except deep vein thrombosis. We applied propensity 
score weights to each of the following four groups – pre-policy targeted group, post-policy 
targeted group, pre-policy nontargeted group, and post-policy nontargeted group – then 
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performed a difference-in-differences analysis. The following steps describe how we integrate 
propensity scores into a difference-in-differences model. 
First, we defined four groups:  
• Group 1 –Targeted surgical procedures in the pre-policy period 
• Group 2 –Targeted surgical procedures in the post-policy period 
• Group 3 –Nontargeted surgical procedures in the pre-policy period 
• Group 4 –Nontargeted surgical procedures in the post-policy period 
Second, we estimated the propensity score by regressing a group as a function of patient 
and hospital characteristics using a multinomial logistic regression. As a result, each observation 
in our sample has four propensity scores – probability of being in Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Third, we created the weight for each individual using the following formula: a propensity score of being in Group 1a propensity score of being in the group in which they actually were  
By doing so, observations that were actually in Group 1 have the weights equal to 1, and 
other observations have weights that represent the similarity to Group 1. 
Fourth, we applied the weights and estimated a difference-in-differences model. 
We chose this matching method because 1) a particular concern about applying matching 
in difference-in-differences models exists (there are two elements to consider in a difference-in-
difference model: the treatment status and time), 2) the application of this method is appropriate 
with cross-section data, and 3) this matching method generates fewer covariates with the 
standardized difference in means greater than 0.25 (represents a substantial difference).27,28 We 
tested the balance of covariates the standardized mean difference, which is defined as the 
difference in means divided by the standard deviation.27 As shown in Appendix Table 3.2, there 
were substantial differences in covariates before applying the propensity score weights, 
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especially between the treatment group and control group. However, the propensity score 
weighting reduced the standardized difference in means to less than 0.25 in all the patient 
demographic variables and hospital characteristics (Table 3.1). To examine the sensitivity of our 
results from the propensity score weighted difference-in-differences analyses, we also performed 
difference-in-differences analyses with a matched sample using one-to-one matching without 
replacement, calipers of 0.02 (calculated by 0.25 * standard deviation of propensity score),48 and 
enforcing common support. The results were identical, with a slightly larger effect (the results 
are not presented).  
Sensitivity analyses 
We performed a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of results across 
model specifications. First, we performed placebo difference-in-differences models by repeating 
the main analyses with a binary placebo P4P indicator to denote that the HAC-POA policy 
would be implemented a year before. We also conducted another placebo test by aggregating two 
years (2006 and 2007) and using a set of those two years as a placebo P4P indicator. If the 
placebo P4P policy variables were associated with improvement in surgical care outcomes 
during placebo years, it would indicate that our results might be due to secular changes in the 
outcomes. Second, we estimated models, adjusted for group-specific time trends, to allow for 
differential time trends between the treatment and control groups during the pre-policy period.19 
A difference-in-differences model that includes treatment and control group-specific time trends 
allows the pre-existing trends to differ in the two groups, and it can be useful to check the 
robustness of the results.43,49 Third, we investigated whether or not an expanded targeted group – 
Iatrogenic pneumothorax following venous catheterization – led to the same policy effects. 
Iatrogenic pneumothorax following venous catheterization was not included in the policy until 
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2013, but was targeted thereafter. This inclusion enabled us to examine whether the policy has a 
similar effect for the expanded target group. Fourth, we conducted analyses using a different 
control group – colon surgery, another high-volume surgical procedure. Because colon surgery 
might be more susceptible to spillover effects, given its high incidence of surgical 
complications,50–52 we tested whether there was a significant change in outcomes when the 
policy was implemented and we did not find evidence of spillover at the time of the policy 
implementation.18,19 Fifth, we used a one-part generalized linear model (GLM) with gamma 
distribution and log link to test the robustness of results from the hospital cost models. A Box-
Cox approach test and modified Park tests were performed to assure the use of appropriate link 
and distribution family for a one-part GLM model, respectively.53,54 Lastly, we estimated results 
from the models not applying the propensity score weights. 
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Abstract  
Disparities in surgical outcomes among minority and low-income patients continue to exist 
despite efforts to improve surgical care quality. One percent of people in the United States are at 
risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket surgical expenditures exceeding 10% of their total income. 
This can be especially pernicious for low-income patients. We examined the unintended 
consequences of the Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present on Admission (HAC-POA) policy, a 
mandated national P4P program for surgical outcomes (incidents of surgical site infection [SSI] 
and deep vein thrombosis [DVT]) for which hospitals were penalized following the HAC-POA’s 
policy implementation for Medicare patients. Patients treated in low-income serving hospitals 
experienced increased incidence of DVT, compared to those treated in other hospitals after the 
HAC-POA policy implementation (0.33 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.01, 0.64; P = 0.045). 
Despite minimal evidence that the P4P program has had negative effects, continuous monitoring 
of P4P programs’ unintended consequences and more efforts to improve existing outcome 
disparities are crucial to promote equity in surgical care.  
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Introduction 
Surgical care is a critical component of healthcare,1,2 comprising 50% of all hospital 
costs.3 Complications can increase surgery-related healthcare costs by up to five times.4 One 
percent of people in the United States are at risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket surgical 
expenditures, exceeding 10% of their total income.5 These high expenditures can be especially 
pernicious for low-income patients.6  
Despite efforts to improve surgical care quality, disparities in surgical outcomes continue 
to exist for minority and low-income patients.7–10 For example, black patients are at greater risk 
of mortality than white patients across numerous surgical procedures.11 Patients residing in low-
income communities are more likely to have poor surgical outcomes.8 Moreover, minority 
patients tend to receive care at low-quality12 or high-cost hospitals,13 increasing their risk of 
experiencing poor-quality care and further widening disparities in surgical outcomes at these 
hospitals. These hospitals are more likely to locate in the South,13,14 have fewer surgical volumes 
and have greater surgical complications, which is attributable to higher costs of care at these 
hospitals.13 
Over the past decades, pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used as a tool to 
improve quality and reduce cost simultaneously by linking payment to quality measures. In 
particular, large-scale P4P programs have been increasingly implemented in inpatient settings, 
led primarily by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,15,16 and many of these 
programs have targeted surgical care. One large-scale P4P program is the Hospital Acquired 
Condition Present On Admission (HAC-POA) policy. This mandated national P4P program 
penalizes hospitals by not paying for the costs of preventable complications that occur during the 
hospitalization of Medicare patients following certain types of surgical procedures, including 
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cardiac, orthopedic, and obesity-related bariatric surgery. Thus, hospitals would bear the costs to 
treat such complications. Hospitals are not penalized for patients whose diagnoses were present 
at the time of inpatient admission for these conditions (e.g., readmission and transfer from other 
hospitals with these conditions). A prior study showed that the HAC-POA policy was related to 
reductions in surgical complications, using a simple pre post design.17 In previous research, our 
team found that the HAC-POA policy improved several dimensions of surgical care, including 
the incidence of complications, length-of-stay, and hospital costs.  
Although P4P programs are aimed at improving the quality of care, there are concerns 
that P4P programs may have unintended negative consequences.18–20 Hospitals serving high 
percentages of minority or low-income patients may be disproportionately penalized under 
P4P.21,22 For example, studies have documented that these hospitals provide a poorer quality of 
care, which is partly due to the composition of their patient population (e.g., greater shares of 
high-risk patients, such as elderly and Medicaid patients).7,14,23 These hospitals also tend to be 
located in economically-challenged areas,24 making adequate infrastructure and access to 
resources required to improve clinical care difficult.7,20 Financial penalties imposed pursuant to 
P4P might further burden these hospitals, despite the fact that they are the ones in the most dire 
need of resources and care improvement.25 If penalities are tied to absolute performance, rather 
than improvement, surgical outcomes in these disadvantaged hospitals might worsen as a result 
of decreased payments from not meeting P4P criteria,26 and thereby quality gaps persist.27   
Few studies have examined the unintended consequences of P4P programs.19 As such, 
little is known about the impact of P4P programs on minority and low-income patients and the 
hospitals that disproportionately serve them. We therefore sought to answer whether the HAC-
POA policy was associated with worse outcomes for four subgroups: (1) minority patients, (2) 
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low-income patients, (3) patients treated at hospitals that serve more minority patients, and (4) 
patients treated at hospitals based in low-income communities.  
 
Study Data and Methods 
DATA We used the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) National Inpatient Sample 
data, between the fourth quarter of 2004 and the third quarter of 2015. The unit of analysis was 
an episode of inpatient surgical care in patients aged 65 years and older who were primarily 
covered by Medicare and who underwent the selected surgical procedures, which were identified 
using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) procedural codes. We 
used targeted (henceforth “treatment group”) and non-targeted (henceforth “control group”) 
surgical procedures of the HAC-POA policy to measure the effect of implementing the HAC-
POA policy. This enabled us to adjust for secular changes in surgical complications. Our 
analyses included 1,077,600 episodes of surgical care representing 936,550 inpatient stays in the 
treatment group and 141,050 inpatient stays in the control group. We excluded inpatient stays 
involving patients transferred in from other facilities,28 patients with surgical complications as 
the first diagnosis (i.e., present upon admission),29 low-volume hospitals (< 30 cases per 
procedure) to avoid unstable estimates due to small sample size, and hospitals not subject to the 
HAC-POA policy (e.g., critical access hospitals, located in Maryland).30  
TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP The treatment group included cardiac (implantable 
electronic devices), orthopedic (spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee and total hip 
replacement), and obesity-related bariatric procedures as described previously. We selected 
appendectomy and cholecystectomy as a control group based on criteria used in prior research.31 
These are high-volume procedures with a sufficiently large number of complications. They are 
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also less likely to be affected by spillover effects, in which the policy affects the care given in 
procedures not targeted by the policy because they fall into distinct surgical specialties.   
OUTCOMES The outcomes of this study were (1) the incidence of surgical site infection (SSI) 
following cardiac, certain orthopedic (spine, neck, shoulder, and elbow) or obesity-related 
bariatric procedures, as well as appendectomy and cholecystectomy procedures, and (2) the 
incidence of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) following total knee and total hip replacement, 
appendectomy and cholecystectomy procedures. We measured these outcomes dichotomously (0 
= no SSI or no DVT, 1 = SSI or DVT) using ICD-9 codes (Appendix Table 4.1). These outcomes 
were subject to the HAC-POA penalty when they occurred during hospitalization. 
MAIN PREDICTOR Our main predictor was the HAC-POA policy implementation, which 
occurred during the fourth quarter of 2008. Although the HAC-POA policy was first 
implemented in the fourth quarter of 2007 for the initial target procedures, the fourth quarter of 
2008 is the first period that involved a penalty for the treatment group of this study.  
SUBGROUPS OF INTEREST We were interested in four population subgroups: (1) minority 
vs. non-minority, (2) low-income vs. higher-income, (3) minority serving vs. non-minority 
serving hospitals, and (4) low-income serving vs. non-low-income serving hospitals. First, we 
classified patients into four race/ethnicity categories: non-Hispanic white (henceforth “white”), 
non-Hispanic black (henceforth “black”), Hispanic, and other (including Asian, Pacific Islander, 
Native Americans, and others). Asian and other racial groups were combined due to small 
sample size. Second, we defined low-income patients as those residing in the lowest income 
quartile zipcodes. All other  patients were defined as non-low-income patients (henceforth 
“higher-income patients”). Third, we ranked hospitals based on percentage of any non-white 
(henceforth “minority”) patients, using the highest decile as a cut-off point, as in prior 
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studies.26,32 Fourth, we identified hospitals that serve the lowest-income patients using zip codes, 
data the HCUP obtained from Claritas.33 We ranked hospitals based on percent of low-income 
patients, and categorized the highest decile as hospitals serving low-income patients. We 
categorized the rest of the hospitals as hospitals not serving low-income patients (henceforth 
“higher-income serving hospitals”). 
ANALYSIS To examine the impact of the HAC-POA policy on minority patients and hospitals 
that disproportionately serve minority patients or low-income patients we used a propensity 
score-weighted difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approaches to account for 
potential time-invariant confounders and pre-policy imbalances between treatment and control 
groups. 
Four-Group Propensity Score Weighting We began by estimating propensity score 
weights for three groups (the treatment group in the post-policy period, the control group in the 
pre-policy period, and the control group in the post-policy period)34 to account for differences 
between treatment and control groups at pre- and post-policy periods34 . The goal was to make 
these groups as similar as possible to the pre-policy treatment group by applying propensity 
score weights. This method substantially reduces bias in DD estimates when treatment and 
control groups are imbalanced.34 The propensity score, defined as the probability of being in the 
pre-policy treatment group relative to the other three groups, was estimated using a multinomial 
logistic regression, controlling for variables that may not have been affected by the HAC-POA 
policy to avoid bias.34 Adjusted variables were patient characteristics (gender [female/male], age 
[years], median household income for patient’s zip code by quartile, and comorbidities [29 
indicators from the modified Elixhauser index]) and hospital characteristics (bed size 
[small/medium/large], ownership [public/private], and location and teaching status [rural 
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teaching and non-teaching/urban non-teaching/urban teaching]). Variables that may have been 
affected by the policy (e.g., surgical volume) were not balanced at this stage.34 We then divided 
the propensity scores from the pre-policy treatment group by each group’s propensity score to 
generate weights. The pre-policy treatment group was assigned a weight equal to 1, and other 
observation weights represented the probability of being in the pre-policy treatment group. To 
assess balance in covariates, we compared unweighted and weighted characteristics of each of 
the three groups (the post-policy treatment group, the pre-policy control group, and the post-
policy control group) to the pre-policy treatment group. Then, we assessed balance using 
standardized difference in means, which is defined as the difference in means divided by the 
standard deviation.35  
Descriptive Statistics To begin, we examined the key characteristics of the study sample 
in the treatment group by subgroup of interest (i.e., patients’ race and income level, and hospitals’ 
minority and low-income patient serving status) by applying the four-group propensity score 
weights. A chi-square test was used for categorical variables and t-test was used for continuous 
variables.  
Regression Analyses Our regression analysis consisted of two parts. First, we assessed 
whether there are differences in the effect of the HAC-POA policy on surgical complications 
based on pre-post difference among the treatment group only. At this stage, we adjusted for 
patient characteristics, but not hospital characteristics to be comparable with work from Qasim et 
al. (2013),8 which evaluated disparities in surgical outcomes using the same data set for an 
earlier time period than the HAC-POA policy implementation. We examined unadjusted and 
adjusted incidence rates of surgical complications (i.e., SSI and DVT) before and after the HAC-
POA policy implementation.  
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Second, we used a DD and a DDD approach to evaluate the effect of the P4P policy on 
minority and low-income patients and hospitals disproportionately serving them. We obtained 
the DD estimates (the changes in outcomes between the treatment and control groups before and 
after the HAC-POA policy implementation) within the subgroups, then compared the DD 
estimates between the different categories of the subgroups (i.e., white vs. minority patients, low-
income vs. higher-income, minority-serving vs. non-minority-serving hospitals, low-income-
serving vs. higher-income-serving hospitals), by including a three-way interaction (the policy 
indicator × the post-policy period indicator × the subgroup indicator). This estimation ensured 
that changes in outcomes were unrelated to certain potential time-invariant confounders, such as 
unobserved hospital motivation to improve outcomes and idiosyncratic efforts to improve quality 
from different providers and hospital systems, which could lead to biased effect estimates of the 
impact of the P4P policy. We included the natural log of the surgical volume for each hospital, 
type of admission [elective/non-elective], and indicator variables for years, procedure types, and 
hospitals in addition to patient and hospital characteristics described earlier. Additional details on 
the DD and DDD models are available in the Appendix.  
We estimated linear probability (ordinary least squares) models to preserve the 
interpretability of the interactions,36 and clustered standard errors by hospital to account for 
patients within the same hospitals. For all models, we applied the four group propensity score 
weights. Statistical significance was determined as p < 0.05, and all statistical tests were 2-sided. 
We conducted all analyses using Stata MP Version 15.1 (StataCorp). The institutional review 
board at the University of California, San Francisco approved this study. 
Sensitivity Analyses As a sensitivity analysis, we estimated models using an alternative 
threshold of the top quartile to identify minority-serving and low-income-serving hospitals, 
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similar to a prior study.26 We also conducted several other sensitivity analyses to assess the 
robustness of our results, including models that use public ownership (public vs. private 
hospitals) to define minority-serving hospitals, aggregate all minority patients into one group, 
use logistic regression, and use one to one matching without replacement, calipers of 0.02 
(calculated by 0.25 × standard deviation of propensity score),37 and enforcing common support. 
Details on these sensitivity analyses are available in the Appendix.  
LIMITATIONS This study has a number of limitations related to data and estimation. First, our 
study uses a quasi-experimental design employing a DDD approach in combination with 
propensity score weighting, which brings several assumptions that are challenging to meet for an 
unbiased estimate. These assumptions include the parallel trend assumption (trends in outcomes 
are similar for treatment and control groups prior to the intervention and would continue to be so 
if there were no treatment) and an assumption of no spillover from the treatment group to the 
control group.38,39  We conducted multiple tests suggested by a prior study39 to evaluate these 
conditions. We tested the significance of the interaction term between the linear time trend and 
the treatment group during the pre-P4P policy period to check the parallel trend assumption, and 
we adjusted for group-specific time trends in the models to allow for differential time trends 
during the pre-policy period39 as robustness checks. We assessed a spillover effect in the control 
group by testing for a change in these surgical procedures’ outcomes at the time of the HAC-
POA policy implementation.38,39 We did not find evidence of spillover in the control group. 
Second, our DDD analysis relies on the hypothesis that one group would be treated differently 
from the other (e.g., minority patients vs. white patients), while a conventional DDD approach 
uses an exogenous subgroup as the second treatment group (i.e., a group that is only affected by 
the policy within the treatment group). Third, we derived minority-serving and low-income 
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serving status from variables that were adjusted in the model (i.e., race and income). Thus, the 
correlation between these variables could cause an issue. However, we tested the models without 
race and income covariates, and it did not affect the results. Fourth, although the HAC-POA 
policy targets high-volume and/or high-cost surgical procedures, surgical complication rates for 
such procedures are lower than 1 percent. This low surgical complication rate reduces statistical 
power to detect cross-group differences. Finally, it is possible that patients were misclassified in 
terms of race, since our data assessed race via simple observation rather than explicit questioning 
of patients,40 and should be considered in the interpretation.  
 
Study Results 
COVARIATE BALANCE BEORE AND AFTER PROPENSITY SCORE WEIGHTING 
Although a substantial difference existed in the unweighted sample, propensity score weighting 
balanced the covariates for all three groups (the pre-policy control, the post-policy treatment, and 
the post-policy control) with the pre-policy treatment group. When comparing each of the three 
groups to the pre-policy treatment group, characteristics of the study population weighted by 
propensity score were largely similar, and the standardized differences in means were less than 
0.05 in all the patient demographics and hospital characteristic variables, except for location and 
teaching status in the post-policy treatment and control groups (Appendix Table 4.2, 4.3 & 4.4). 
These results indicate well-balanced covariates.35,37 A boxplot of the standardized differences in 
means also shows that propensity score weighting substantially reduced covariate imbalances 
between groups (Figure 4.1).  
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUBGROUPS OF INTEREST After the propensity score 
weighting, relative to white patients, black patients were younger (73.6 years vs. 75.2 years; p < 
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0.001), had more comorbidities (2.3 vs. 1.9; p < 0.001), and were more likely to reside in lower-
income areas (48.6 percent  vs. 22.4 percent in the lowest income quartile; p < 0.001) and be 
treated in government-owned hospitals (53.1 percent  vs. 48.5 percent; p < 0.001). Hispanic 
patients also demonstrated characteristics similar to those of black patients, except that they were 
more likely to be treated in private hospitals. Patients in the “other” racial group were more 
likely to have the characteristics of white patients (Appendix Table 4.5). Low-income patients 
were more prone to be female (61.9% vs. 60.2%; p < 0.001 ), older (73.6 years old vs. 75.2 years 
old; p < 0.001), treated in hospitals located in rural areas (16.0% vs 5.3%; p < 0.001), and treated 
in government-owned hospitals (51.1% vs. 47.5%; p = 0.025), compared to higher-income 
patients (Appendix Table 4.6). Minority-serving and low-income-serving hospitals that treated 
patients for targeted procedures had lower surgical volumes relative to the other hospitals 
(Appendix Table 4.7). 
REGRESSION ANALYSES To assess the effect of the HAC-POA policy on subgroups, we 
first used a pre-post analysis weighted by a propensity score for the treatment group only. We 
then extended the analysis to include the control group to determine the causal effect of the 
policy on subgroups.  
Pre-post differences by race and income Pre–post difference for the incidence of SSI 
did not differ within race and within the same income level. Table 4.1 shows the patient 
characteristics’ adjusted incidence rates for surgical complications by race and by income among 
the treatment group (Unadjusted incidence rates of surgical complications are presented in the 
Appendix Table 4.8 and 4.9).  
Within the categories of patients’ races, adjusted incidence rates of SSI did not differ 
before and after the HAC-POA policy implementation. The pre-post differences between any 
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minority patient group and white patients were also not significant. In terms of income level, 
neither low- nor higher-income patients experienced changes in the incidence of SSI related to 
the HAC-POA policy implementation. A pre-post change in the incidence of SSI between two 
income levels also did not differ.  
Regarding the incidence of DVT, pre-post difference within white patients and patients in 
both income levels were significantly decreased. White patients had a decreased adjusted 
incidence of DVT for the post-policy period relative to the pre-policy period (-0.19 percentage 
points [95% CI, -0.30, -0.07; p < 0.001]), but there were no significant pre-post changes 
observed in any minority patient group. Differences between groups were not significant. Both 
low-income and higher -income patients had a decreased incidence of DVT, which resulted in no 
differences in DVT incidence between two groups. Low-income patients had a 0.19 percentage 
point decrease in the incidence of DVT (95% CI, -0.30, -0.07; p = 0.001), whereas higher-
income patients had a 0.20 percentage point decrease (95% CI, -0.32, -0.08; p = 0.001). 
Pre-post differences of patients in minority and low-income serving hospitals 
Notably, pre-post analysis indicates that the HAC-POA policy was not associated with 
improvement in SSI but with reductions in DVT among patients treated in higher-income 
hospitals. Receiving the care either in hospitals that serve minorities or hospitals that serve non-
minorities was not related to the different probabilities in acquiring SSI or DVT. Table 4.2 
presents the adjusted surgical complication incidence rates for patients in minority and low-
income serving hospitals. 
Patients in minority serving hospitals and patients in non-minority serving hospitals did 
not experience a significant improvement in SSI incidence. When testing the difference between 
groups, the changes also did not differ. Similar to the within and between group differences of 
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minority serving hospitals, patients in low-income serving and higher-income serving hospitals 
did not have changes in SSI incidence, nor did comparisons between groups.  
For patients in minority-serving hospitals, we observed a greater reduction of DVT 
incidence in the post-policy period (-0.41 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.65, -0.17; p = 0.004) 
than for patients treated in non-minority serving hospitals (-0.18 percentage points; 95% CI, -
0.28, -0.07; p = 0.001), although the difference between the two groups was marginally 
significant (-0.23 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.49, 0.03; p = 0.080). Patients in higher-income 
serving hospitals experienced significant improvements in DVT incidence (-0.21 percentage 
points; 95% CI, -0.32, -0.11; p < 0.001), but those in low-income serving hospitals did not 
experience significant improvement (-0.07 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.20, 0.07; p = 0.329) 
after the HAC-POA policy implementation.  
Difference-in-differences by race and income We turn to our main results to investigate 
whether there are differences in the effects of the HAC-POA policy by subgroup, using the 
treatment and control groups. Table 4.3 shows the patient and hospital characteristics’ adjusted 
incidence rates of surgical complications in the treatment and control groups by patients’ race 
and income.  
White and black patients in the treatment group experienced improved SSI incidence 
compared to control group patients, whereas Hispanic and “other” patients did not experience 
changes following the HAC-POA policy. However, testing the differences between minority 
groups and white patients showed that the SSI incidence did not worsen in any minority group. 
Similarly, low-income patients did not experience worse SSI incidence compared to higher-
income patients.  
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No minority group experienced different changes in DVT incidence relative to their 
counterparts. Although not significant, the greatest increase in DVT incidence was observed in 
Hispanic patients (0.26 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.21, 0.72; p = 0.273). The incidence of 
DVT in low-income patients also did not differ from the incidence in higher-income patients 
(0.14 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.12, 0.40; p = 0.309) 
Difference-in-differences by minority serving and low-income serving hospitals  
Differences in pre-post changes between the treatment group and the control group for hospitals’ 
minority and low-income serving status are presented in Table 4.4. 
The incidences of SSI and DVT were not worsened in patients treated in minority serving 
hospitals, relative to their counterparts. Patients in low-income serving hospitals also did not 
experience worsened incidence of SSI.  
One notable finding is that the HAC-POA policy implementation coincided with a 
significant worsening in the incidence of DVT among patients treated in low-income serving 
hospitals (0.33 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.01, 0.65; p = 0.045).  The DVT incidence increased 
among patients treated in low-income serving hospitals (0.27 percentage points; 95% CI, 0, 0.53; 
p = 0.05), but there were no changes in DVT incidence among patients treated in higher-income 
serving hospitals (-0.06 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.24, 0.12; p = 0.522). This indicates the 
negative effect of the HAC-POA policy on patients treated in low-income serving hospitals. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES We conducted five robustness analyses. First, we used different 
cut-off points to define minority and low-income serving hospitals and found similar results. 
Second, we found consistent results after pooling all nonwhite patients to define minority 
patients and using public ownership to identify minority serving hospitals (Appendix Table 4.10). 
Third, we estimated all models using a logistic regression, yielding results nearly identical to 
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those from the linear probability model (Appendix Table 4.11). Fourth, the results of one-to-one 
matching were consistent across all study outcomes. Finally, including group-specific time 
trends did not change the results. 
 
Discussion 
In a study of potential unintended consequences of a national P4P program among 
Medicare patients, we found that changes in surgical complications following the policy 
implementation did not differ between white and minority patients or between patients treated in 
minority serving and non-minority serving hospitals. However, we observed evidence of 
negative effects for patients in low-income serving hospitals, compared to those in other 
hospitals. 
We observed racial disparities in surgical outcomes after the HAC-POA policy 
implementation for the treatment group. Blacks had a higher incidence of DVT, and the “other” 
racial group had a higher incidence of SSI, after accounting for patient characteristics. This 
finding is consistent with extant literature documenting disparities in surgical outcomes.7–10 
However, changes in the incidence of surgical complications before and after policy 
implementation between whites and minority groups did not differ, suggesting that the HAC-
POA policy was not associated with a widening of disparities between white and minority 
patients’ incidence of surgical complications. We also found no evidence of negative effects of 
the HAC-POA policy on low-income patients. 
A recent study by Figueroa and colleagues (2018)26 found, despite persistent disparities, 
greater improvement in outcomes among minority-serving hospitals.  
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Similarly, we found little evidence to support an association between the HAC-POA policy and a 
greater improvement in surgical outcomes for patients treated in hospitals that serve minorities, 
indicating that minority-serving hospitals might have been aware of their high risk of being 
penalized under the P4P program, thereby motivating them to improve the quality of surgical 
care. This is contrary to the concern articulated in the literature that P4P programs widen racial 
disparities or place undue burdens on low-income patients or minority-serving hospitals.  
However, it is noteworthy that we found a significant reduction in the incidence of DVT 
for patients treated in higher-income serving hospitals, while surgical complications for those 
treated in low-income serving hospitals showed no changes in our pre-post analysis. This result 
is similar to a prior study conducted by Qasim and Andrews (2013) that indicated greater 
improvement in patients treated in high-income serving hospitals.8 These raise  the concern that 
low-income serving hospitals might lack the organizational knowledge, skills, and information 
required for establishing a system to improve the quality of surgical care. 
The results from the DDD approach indicate no evidence that minority patients became 
more likely to experience worsened outcomes than white patients after policy implementation. 
Additionally, we did not find evidence of the policy’s negative effects on low-income patients or 
those treated in minority-serving hospitals. However, our results show significant evidence of 
worsened outcome among patients treated in low-income serving hospitals associated with the 
HAC-POA policy. Given that the adjusted incidence rates of DVT in the treatment group were 
0.71% during the pre-policy period, an increase of 0.33 percentage points is equivalent to about a 
50% increase in the incidence of DVT. With the costs associated with DVT following total knee 
and total hip replacements (the targeted procedures of the HAC-POA policy) ranging between 
$3,000 and $9,500,41 a 50% increase of the incidence of DVT places a substantial burden on the 
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healthcare system. Considering that catastrophic healthcare expenditure can push patients into 
poverty,42 increased financial burden may endanger patients, especially low-income patients who 
already struggle financially. This finding extends prior research by Qasim and Andrews that 
failed to account for hospital characteristics known to be associated with surgical outcomes, such 
as surgical volume, hospital location, and teaching status. 
Our findings contribute to a new body of evidence that a large-scale national P4P 
program might have negative effects on hospitals incapable of investing in infrastructure to 
improve the quality of surgical care, such as low-income serving hospitals. Another possible 
explanation for our finding of worsened outcomes in low-income serving hospitals may be the 
structural characteristics of hospitals. We observed that low-income serving hospitals were more 
likely to be located in rural areas and have lower surgical volume than higher-income serving 
hospitals. The policy’s negative effect on low-income serving hospitals was still apparent after 
accounting for hospital characteristic in our study. Future studies should take other structural 
factors that have shown to contribute to the quality of surgical care, such as nurse-to-patient ratio 
and surgeon volume,43–45 into account. 
We were not, however, able to determine the reason why hospitals with 
disproportionately higher shares of minority patients were less likely to be influenced by the 
HAC-POA policy, unlike hospitals that serve low-income patients. One potential explanation is 
that hospitals serving low-income patients might be less profitable than hospitals that serve 
minorities, and thereby have fewer resources to invest in improving quality of care. In our data, 
the share of low-income patients in minority serving hospitals was approximately one-third, 
whereas low-income serving hospitals treated approximately two-thirds of low-income patients. 
Given that improving quality of care requires investment, it might not be surprising that low-
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income serving hospitals responded less vigorously to the P4P program. Future studies aimed at 
identifying other potential reasons for the relatively higher influence of the P4P program on low-
income-serving hospitals are warranted. 
 
Conclusion 
We did not find that a mandated national P4P program for Medicare patients was 
associated with widening disparities in surgical outcomes among minority and low-income 
patients or patients treated at minority serving hospitals. However, we found evidence of 
worsened outcomes in patients in hospitals that serve more low-income patients relative to 
hospitals that serve fewer low-income patients. Despite our limited evidence that the P4P 
program has had negative effects, persistent monitoring of P4P programs’ unintended 
consequences and more efforts to improve existing disparities in outcomes are crucial to promote 
equity in surgical care.  
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Table 4.1  Effects of the HAC-POA policy on adjusted surgical complication incidence rates for 
Medicare patients in the treatment group by patients’ race and income (propensity score 
weighted) 
 
 Pre Policy 
Period 
(2005-2008) 
(%) 
Post Policy 
Period 
(2009-2015) 
(%) 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Difference-in-
Differences 
Surgical Site Infection 
White 0.41 0.35 -0.06 
(-0.16 to 0.04) 
– 
Black 0.41 0.35 -0.05 
(-0.38 to 0.26) 
-0.55 
(-1.45 to 0.34) 
Hispanic 0.62 0.35 -0.27 
(-0.68 to 0.14) 
-0.20 
(-0.96 to 0.54) 
Other 0.58 0.90 0.31 
(-0.21 to 0.84) 
-0.04 
(-1.22 to 1.13) 
     
Higher-income 0.42 0.36 -0.06 
(-0.16 to 0.04) 
– 
Low-income 0.47 0.41 -0.06 
(-0.25 to 0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.21 to 0.20) 
Deep Vein Thrombosis  
White 0.71 0.51 -0.19*** 
(-0.29 to -0.09) 
– 
Black 0.81 0.66 -0.15 
(-0.46 to 0.15) 
0.03 
(-0.27 to 0.35) 
Hispanic 0.86 0.67 -0.19 
(-0.50 to 0.12) 
0.001 
(-0.31 to 0.31) 
Other 0.76 0.55 -0.20 
(-0.56 to 0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.37 to 0.34) 
     
Higher-income 0.75 0.55 -0.20** 
(-0.32 to -0.08) 
– 
Low-income 0.64 0.46 -0.19** 
(-0.30 to -0.07) 
0.01 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015. Models adjusted for patient characteristics including 
gender (female/male), age (years), median household income for patient’s zip code in quartile, 
and comorbidities (29 indicators for the modified Elixhauser index). 
NOTES: Pre-post differences and difference-in-differences are changes in percentage points. 
Treatment group includes patients who underwent the targeted procedures of the HAC-POA 
policy (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total 
knee and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). Other race included 
Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others. Low-income included hospital stays of 
patients residing in the lowest income quartile in a zip code. Higher-income included hospital 
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stays of patients residing in the income quartiles of 25% to 100% in a zip code. P values are 
shown for pre-post difference and difference-in-differences. 95% confidence intervals are in 
parentheses. 
HAC-POA = Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; CI = confidence interval; 
Difference-in-differences = (Minority Post – Minority Pre) – (White Post – White Pre), where 
minority refers to black, Hispanic, or other, or (Low income Post – Low income Pre) – (Higher 
income Post – Higher income Pre).  
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001 
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Table 4.2  Effects of the HAC-POA policy on adjusted surgical complication incidence rates for 
Medicare patients in the treatment group by hospitals’ minority and low income-serving status 
(propensity score weighted) 
 
 Pre Policy 
Period 
(2005-2008) 
(%) 
Post Policy 
Period 
(2009-2015) 
(%) 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Difference-in-
Differences 
Surgical Site Infection 
Non-minority serving 0.40 0.37 -0.03 
(-0.12 to 0.06) 
– 
Minority serving 0.62 0.36 -0.26 
(-0.61 to 0.08) 
-0.24 
(-0.60 to 0.11) 
     
Higher-income serving 0.43 0.38 -0.05 
(-0.15 to 0.05) 
– 
Low-income serving 0.42 0.29 -0.13 
(-0.36 to 0.10) 
-0.08 
(-0.32 to 0.17) 
Deep Vein Thrombosis  
Non-minority serving 0.71 0.53 -0.18*** 
(-0.28 to -0.07) 
– 
Minority serving 0.92 0.51 -0.41*** 
(-0.65 to -0.17) 
-0.23* 
(-0.49 to 0.03) 
     
Higher-income serving 0.75 0.53 -0.21*** 
(-0.32 to -0.11) 
– 
Low-income serving 0.56 0.49 -0.07 
(-0.20 to 0.07) 
0.14 
(-0.03 to 0.32) 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015. Models adjusted for patient characteristics including 
gender (female/male), age (years), median household income for patient’s zip code in quartile, 
and comorbidities (29 indicators for the modified Elixhauser index). 
NOTES: Pre-post differences and difference-in-differences are changes in percentage points. 
Treatment group includes patients who underwent the targeted procedures of the HAC-POA 
policy (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total 
knee and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). Minority-serving 
hospitals were defined as the highest decile of hospitals, by the proportion of black and Hispanic 
patients. The other 90% of hospitals were categorized as non-minority serving hospitals. Low-
income-serving hospitals were the top 10% of hospitals that serve patients whose median income 
is below 25% for patient’s zip code. The other 90% of hospitals were categorized as non-low-
income serving hospitals. P values are shown for pre-post difference and difference-in-
differences. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Difference-in-differences = (Minority 
serving Post – Minority serving Pre) – (Non minority serving Post – Non minority serving Pre), 
or (Low income serving Post – Low income serving Pre) – (Higher income serving Post – Higher 
income serving Pre). *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001 
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Table 4.3 Effects of the HAC-POA policy on adjusted surgical complication incidence rates for 
Medicare patients in the treatment group and the control group by patients’ race and income 
(propensity score weighted)  
 
 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 
 
 
DD 
(Treatment 
vs. Control)  
 
DDD 
(vs. 
Reference) 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Surgical Site Infection     
White -0.10 0.15 -0.26* Reference 
Black -0.14 0.67* -0.81* -0.55 
Hispanic -0.32 0.14 -0.46 -0.21 
Other 0.43 0.73 -0.30 -0.04 
     
Higher income -0.08 0.18 -0.26* Reference 
Low income -0.16 0.23 -0.40 -0.13 
Deep Vein Thrombosis     
White 0.01 0.05 -0.04 Reference 
Black 0.15 -0.04 0.16 0.23 
Hispanic 0.03 -0.18 0.27 0.26 
Other -0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.11 
     
Higher-income 0.01 0.06 -0.05* Reference 
Low-income 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.14 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015. Models adjusted for patient characteristics (gender, age, 
median household income for patient’s zip code in quartile, and comorbidities), hospital 
characteristics (bed size, ownership, location and teaching status, and the natural log of the 
surgical volume), type of admission, and indicators for years, procedure types, and hospitals. 
NOTES: Changes are in percentage points. A treatment group includes patients who underwent 
the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic 
[spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric 
procedures). A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a 
cholecystectomy. Other race included Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others. 
Low-income included hospital stays of patients residing in the lowest income quartile in a zip 
code. Higher-income included hospital stays of patients residing in the income quartiles of 25% 
to 100% in a zip code. P values are shown for difference-in-differences and difference-in-
difference-in-differences. HAC-POA = Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; 
DD = Difference-in-differences = (Treatmet Post – Treatment Pre) – (Control Post – Control 
Pre); DDD = Difference-in-difference-in-differences = (DD Minority – DD White), where 
minority is black, Hispanic, or other, or (DD Low-income – DD Higher-income). 
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 
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Table 4.4 Effects of the HAC-POA policy on adjusted surgical complication incidence rates for 
Medicare patients in the treatment group and the control group by hospitals’ minority and low 
income-serving status (propensity score weighted)   
 
 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group DD 
(Treatment 
vs. Control) 
 
DDD 
(vs. Reference) 
 Pre-Post 
Difference 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Surgical Site Infection     
Non-minority serving -0.06 0.23 -0.28** Reference 
Minority serving -0.50 -0.12 -0.37 -0.09 
     
Higher-income serving -0.05 0.23 -0.28** Reference 
Low-income serving -0.63 -0.17 -0.46 -0.17 
Deep Vein Thrombosis     
Non-minority serving 0.03 0.04 -0.01 Reference 
Minority serving -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.11 
     
Higher-income serving 0.01 0.06 -0.06 Reference 
Low-income serving 0.04 -0.22 0.27** 0.33** 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015. Models adjusted for patient characteristics (gender, age, 
median household income for patient’s zip code in quartile, and comorbidities), hospital 
characteristics (bed size, ownership, location and teaching status, and the natural log of the 
surgical volume), type of admission, and indicators for years, procedure types, and hospitals. 
NOTES: Changes are in percentage points. A treatment group includes patients who underwent 
the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic 
[spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric 
procedures). A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a 
cholecystectomy. Minority-serving hospitals were defined as the highest decile of hospitals, by 
the proportion of black and Hispanic patients. The other 90%of hospitals were categorized as 
non-minority serving hospitals. Low-income serving hospitals were the top 10% of hospitals that 
serve patients whose median income is below 25% for patient’s zip code. The other 90% of 
hospitals were categorized as non-low-income serving hospitals. P values are not shown for post-
pre difference. P values are shown for difference-in-differences and difference-in-difference-in-
differences. HAC-POA = Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; DD = 
Difference-in-differences = (Treatment Post – Treatment Pre) – (Control Post – Control Pre); 
DDD=Difference-in-difference-in-differences = (DD Minority serving – DD Non-minority 
serving) or (DD Low-income serving – DD Higher-income serving) 
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 
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Figure 4.1 Boxplots of standardized mean differences of covariates for the four groups 
NOTES: Group 1 = the treatment group in the pre-policy period; Group 2 = the treatment group 
in the post-policy period; Group 3 = the control group in the pre-policy period; Group 4 = the 
control group in the post-policy period. A treatment group includes patients who underwent the 
HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic 
[spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric 
procedures). A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a 
cholecystectomy. Unweighted refers to standardized differences in means of covariates before 
the four-group propensity score weighting. Weighted is standardized differences in means of 
covariates after the four-group propensity score weighting. Standardized differences in means 
greater than 0.1 or 0.2 represents a substantial difference. The error bars present the upper and 
lower extreme values, but some of them are very small in scale. 
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Appendix Table 4.1 International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification Code for defining the sample 
 
Procedure ICD-9-CM Procedural Code  Outcome 
ICD-9-CM 
Diagnostic Code 
CMS P4P Target Procedures (Treatment group) 
Cardiac Implantable  
Electronic Device  
00.50, 00.51, 00.52, 
00.53, 00.54, 37.80, 
37.81, 37.82, 37.83, 
37.85, 37.86, 37.87, 
37.94, 37.96, 37.98, 
37.74, 37.75, 37.76, 
37.77, 37.79, 37.89 
Surgical Site 
Infection 
 
996.61, 998.59 
 
Certain Orthopedic 
Procedures  
(Spine/Neck/Shoulder 
/Ankle) 
81.01-81.08, 81.23, 
81.24, 81.31-81.38, 
81.83, 81.85  
Surgical Site 
Infection 
996.67, 998.59 
 
Bariatric Surgery  
for Obesity 44.38, 44.39, 44.95  
 
Surgical Site 
Infection  
 
278.01 & (one of 
the following: 
539.01, 539.81, 
998.59) 
Certain Orthopedic 
Procedures  
(Total Knee 
Arthroplasty 
/Total Hip 
Arthroplasty) 
00.85-00.87, 81.51-
81.52, or 81.54 
Deep Vein 
Thrombosis 
415.11, 415.13, 
415.19, 453.40-
453.42 
CMS P4P Non-Target Procedures (Control group) 
Cholecystectomy  
 
51.21, 51.22 (Open); 
51.23, 51.24 
(Laparoscopic) 
 
 
Surgical Site 
Infection 
567, 567.2, 567.21, 
567.22, 567.23, 
567.29, 567.3, 
567.38, 567.39, 
567.8, 567.81, 
567.89, 567.9, 
682.2 
  Deep Vein Thrombosis 
415.11, 415.13, 
415.19, 453.40-
453.42 
Appendectomy 
47.01 
(Laparoscopic); 
47.09 
(Open) 
 
Surgical Site 
Infection 
567, 567.2, 567.21, 
567.22, 567.23, 
567.29, 567.3, 
567.38, 567.39, 
567.8, 567.81, 
567.89, 567.9, 
682.2 
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Procedure ICD-9-CM Procedural Code  Outcome 
ICD-9-CM 
Diagnostic Code 
  Deep Vein Thrombosis 
415.11, 415.13, 
415.19, 453.40-
453.42 
 NOTES ICD-9-CM = International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification; CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid; P4P = pay-for-performance 
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Appendix Table 4.2 Comparison of patient characteristics between the treatment group in the 
pre-policy period and the treatment group in the post-policy period 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 
 
 
Characteristics T Pre T Post 
P 
Value 
SMD 
(T Post 
vs.  
T Pre) T Pre T Post 
P 
Value 
SMD 
(T Post 
vs.  
T Pre) 
Gender, %   <.001    0.99  
   Male 39.4 38.1  -0.03 39.4 39.4  0.00 
Female 60.6 61.9  0.03 60.6 60.6  -0.00 
Race/ethnicity, %   0.01    0.83  
White 88.7 87.1  -0.04 88.7 88.3  -0.01 
Black 4.2 5.3  0.05 4.2 4.3  0.01 
   Hispanic 3.8 4.1  0.01 3.8 4.1  0.01 
Others 3.3 3.5  0.01 3.3 3.3  -0.00 
Age, mean (SD), 
years 
75.5 
(0.05) 
74.7 
(0.04) <.001 -0.11 
75.5 
(0.05) 
74.7 
(0.04) 
<0.00
1 -0.11 
Median Income 
Quartile, %   .83 
   0.01  
   0-25th percentile 22.8 22.7  0.00 22.8 25.0  0.05 
26-50th percentile 27.2 26.6  -0.01 27.2 28.3  0.02 
51-75th percentile 26.0 26.3  0.01 26.0 25.1  -0.02 
76-100th 
percentile 24.0 24.3 
 0.00 24.0 21.5  -0.06 
Elixhauser 
Comorbidity 
Index, % 
  
  
   
 
Acquired Immune 
Deficiency 
syndrome 
0.0 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.94 0.00 
Alcohol abuse 0.6 1.0 <.001 0.04 0.6 0.7 0.22 0.00 
Anemia 13.9 14.4 .35 0.01 13.9 14.9 0.10 0.03 
Rheumatoid 
arthritis /Collagen 
Vascular Disease 
3.1 4.1 <.001 0.05 3.1 3.1 0.54 -0.00 
Chronic blood loss 
anemia 1.5 1.5 .85 -0.00 1.5 1.6 0.26 0.01 
Congestive heart 
failure 4.6 5.0 .001 0.02 4.6 4.7 0.73 0.00 
Chronic 
pulmonary disease 15.1 16.3 <.001 0.03 15.1 15.3 0.48 0.00 
Coagulopathy 1.8 3.3 <.001 0.10 1.8 1.9 0.46 0.01 
Depression 7.4 11.5 <.001 0.14 7.4 7.6 0.47 0.00 
Diabetes, 
uncomplicated 18.6 20.8 <.001 0.06 18.6 18.8 0.26 0.01 
Diabetes with 
chronic 
complications 
1.5 2.2 
<.001 
0.05 1.5 1.6 0.67 0.00 
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 Unweighted Weighted 
Drug abuse 0.1 0.3 <.001 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.37 0.00 
Hypertension 68.0 72.8 <.001 0.11 68.0 68.0 0.98 -0.00 
Hypothyroidism 15.3 18.3 <.001 0.08 15.3 15.3 0.93 -0.00 
Liver disease 0.5 0.8 <.001 0.04 0.5 0.4 0.38 -0.00 
Lymphoma 0.4 0.5 <.001 0.01 0.4 0.4 0.79 0.00 
Fluid and 
electrolyte 
disorders 
10.2 13.2 
<.001 0.09 
10.2 10.6 0.10 
0.01 
Metastatic cancer 0.4 0.4 .04 0.01 0.4 0.4 0.98 0.00 
Neurological 
disorders 5.3 6.3 
<.001 0.04 5.3 5.4 0.31 0.00 
Obesity 7.6 13.6 <.001 0.20 7.6 7.6 0.98 0.00 
Paralysis 0.8 0.9 .07 0.01 0.8 0.8 0.99 -0.00 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 3.8 4.1 
<.001 0.02 3.8 3.8 0.96 0.00 
Psychoses 1.1 1.7 <.001 0.05 1.1 1.1 0.48 0.00 
Pulmonary 
circulation 
disorders 
1.0 1.7 
<.001 0.07 
1.0 1.0 0.36 
0.00 
Renal failure 4.4 8.4 <.001 0.16 4.4 4.6 0.31 0.01 
   Solid tumor 
without  
   metastasis 
0.9 0.8 
<.001 -0.01 
0.9 0.9 0.41 
-0.00 
   Peptic ulcer 
disease      
   excluding bleeding 
0.0 0.0 
.18 -0.00 
0.0 0.0 0.51 
-0.00 
   Valvular disease 5.0 5.3 .04 0.01 5.0 4.9 0.49 -0.01 
Weight loss 0.7 1.3 <.001 0.06 0.7 0.7 0.37 0.00 
Location and 
Teaching Status, %   <.001 
   0.007  
Rural 7.4 9.0  0.07 7.4 8.3  0.04 
Urban, non 
teaching 52.9 43.0 
 -0.21 52.9 59.0  0.12 
   Urban, teaching 39.7 48.0  0.18 39.7 32.7  -0.14 
Ownership, %   <.001    0.38  
Government 47.3 9.0  -0.95 47.3 49.4  0.05 
Private 52.7 91.0  0.95 52.7 50.6  -0.05 
Bed Size, %   <.001    0.69  
Small 12.4 17.2  0.12 12.4 11.6  -0.03 
Medium 22.9 25.9  0.07 22.9 22.2  -0.02 
Large 64.7 67.0  -0.15 64.7 66.2  0.04 
NOTES Other race included Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others. Test 
performed is Chi-square test for categorical variables and t-test for continuous variables. Rows 
may not add up to 100%, due to rounding. Unweighted characteristics are not propensity score-
weighted, but survey weights are accounted for. T = Target group; Pre = Pre-policy period; Post 
= Post-policy period; SMD = Standardized difference in means. 
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Appendix Table 4.3 Comparison of patient characteristics between the treatment group in the 
pre-policy period and the control group in the pre-policy period 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 
 
 
Characteristics T Pre C Pre 
P 
Value 
SMD 
(C Pre 
vs.  
T pre) T Pre C Pre 
P 
Value 
SMD 
(C Pre 
vs.  
T pre) 
Gender, %   <.001    0.25  
   Male 39.4 44.1  0.09 39.4 39.0  -0.01 
Female 60.6 55.9  -0.09 60.6 61.0  0.01 
Race/ethnicity, %   <.001    0.87  
White 88.7 82.2  -0.18 88.7 88.5  -0.01 
Black 4.2 5.0  0.04 4.2 4.4  0.01 
   Hispanic 3.8 7.7  0.17 3.8 3.8  -0.00 
Others 3.3 5.1  0.09 3.3 3.3  -0.00 
Age, mean (SD), 
years 
75.5 
(0.05) 
75.6 
(0.05) 0.53 0.01 
75.5 
(0.05) 
75.5 
(0.05) 0.85 -0.00 
Median Income 
Quartile, %   0.004 
    0.006 
 
   0-25th percentile 22.8 24.7  0.04 22.8 22.0  -0.02 
26-50th percentile 27.2 25.6  -0.03 27.2 27.0  -0.00 
51-75th percentile 26.0 25.5  -0.01 26.0 26.4  0.01 
76-100th percentile 24.0 24.2  0.00 24.0 24.6  0.01 
Elixhauser 
Comorbidity 
Index, % 
  
  
   
 
Acquired Immune 
Deficiency 
syndrome 
0.00 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.63 -0.00 
Alcohol abuse 0.7 0.9 <.001 0.03 0.6 0.6 0.88 0.00 
Anemia 13.9 10.2 <.001 -0.12 13.9 13.4 0.33 -0.02 
Rheumatoid 
arthritis /Collagen 
Vascular Disease 
3.1 2.3 <.001 -0.05 3.1 3.2 0.43 0.01 
Chronic blood loss 
anemia 1.5 0.5 <.001 -0.10 1.5 1.4 0.74 -0.00 
Congestive heart 
failure 4.6 9.3 <.001 0.19 4.6 4.9 0.01 0.01 
Chronic pulmonary 
disease 15.1 17.7 <.001 0.07 15.1 15.6 0.08 0.01 
Coagulopathy 1.8 2.1 .002 0.02 1.8 1.9 0.46 0.01 
Depression 7.4 5.6 <.001 -0.07 7.4 7.6 0.43 0.01 
Diabetes, 
uncomplicated 18.6 22.0 <.001 0.08 18.6 18.7 0.58 0.00 
Diabetes, with 
chronic 
complications 
1.5 2.1 
<.001 
0.05 1.5 1.6 0.49 0.00 
Drug abuse 0.1 0.1 0.96 0.00 0.1 0.2 0.13 0.01 
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 Unweighted Weighted 
Hypertension 68.0 70.0 0.002 -0.02 68.0 68.5 0.15 0.01 
Hypothyroidism 15.3 13.2 <.001 -0.06 15.3 15.6 0.39 0.01 
Liver disease 0.5 2.9 <.001 0.19 0.5 0.4 0.56 -0.00 
Lymphoma 0.4 0.6 <.001 0.03 0.4 0.4 0.92 0.00 
Fluid and 
electrolyte 
disorders 
10.2 19.6 
<.001 0.27 
10.2 10.4 0.52 
0.01 
Metastatic cancer 0.4 1.2 .04 0.09 0.4 0.4 0.19 0.00 
Neurological 
disorders 5.3 5.0 
0.12 -0.01 5.3 5.5 0.20 0.01 
Obesity 7.6 7.0 0.009 -0.02 7.6 7.4 0.44 -0.01 
Paralysis 0.8 1.3 .07 0.04 0.8 0.9 0.10 0.01 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 3.8 5.5 
<.001 0.08 3.8 4.0 0.07 0.01 
Psychoses 1.1 1.2 0.56 0.00 1.1 1.2 0.21 0.01 
Pulmonary 
circulation 
disorders 
1.0 1.3 <.001 
0.04 
1.0 1.1 0.01 
0.01 
Renal failure 4.4 6.1 <.001 0.08 4.4 4.6 0.15 0.01 
   Solid tumor without  
   metastasis 0.9 1.5 
<.001 0.06 0.9 0.9 0.71 0.00 
   Peptic ulcer disease      
   excluding bleeding 0.0 0.1 
.18 0.03 0.0 0.0 0.78 0.00 
   Valvular disease 5.0 6.6 .04 0.07 5.0 5.4 0.04 0.02 
Weight loss 0.7 2.3 <.001 0.13 0.7 0.7 0.07 0.01 
Location and 
Teaching Status, %   <.001 
   0.42  
Rural 7.4 10.7  0.12 7.4 6.8  -0.02 
Urban, non 
teaching 52.9 57.6 
 0.09 52.9 52.0  -0.02 
   Urban, teaching 39.7 31.7  -0.16 39.7 41.1  0.03 
Ownership, %   0.007    0.003  
Government 47.3 44.0  -0.07 47.3 51.0  0.07 
Private 52.7 56.0  0.07 52.7 49.0  -0.07 
Bed Size, %   0.007    0.91  
Small 12.4 9.5  -0.09 12.4 12.5  0.01 
Medium 22.9 24.3  0.04 22.9 23.3  0.01 
Large 64.7 66.2  0.03 64.7 64.1  -0.01 
NOTES Other race included Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others. Test 
performed is Chi-square test for categorical variables and t-test for continuous variables. Rows 
may not add up to 100%, due to rounding. Unweighted characteristics are not propensity score-
weighted, but survey weights are accounted for. T = Target group; C = Control group; Pre = Pre-
policy period; SMD = Standardized difference in means. 
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Appendix Table 4.4 Comparison of patient characteristics between the treatment group in the 
pre-policy period and the control group in the post-policy period 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 
 
 
Characteristics T Pre C Post 
P 
Value 
SMD 
(C Post 
vs.  
T Pre) T Pre C Post 
P 
Value 
SMD 
(C Post 
vs.  
T Pre) 
Gender, %   <.001    0.31  
   Male 39.4 47.5  0.16 39.4 39.9  0.01 
Female 60.6 52.5  -0.16 60.6 60.1  -0.01 
Race/ethnicity, %   <.001    0.47  
White 88.7 79.3  -0.25 88.7 87.7  -0.02 
Black 4.2 6.4  0.10 4.2 4.3  0.00 
   Hispanic 3.8 9.1  0.21 3.8 4.3  0.02 
Others 3.3 5.1  0.09 3.3 3.6  0.02 
Age, mean (SD), 
years 
75.5 
(0.05) 
75.8 
(0.03) <.001 0.04 
75.5 
(0.05) 
75.3 
(0.05) 0.009 -0.02 
Median Income 
Quartile, %   0.03 
    0.05 
 
   0-25th percentile 22.8 25.4  0.06 22.8 24.1  0.03 
26-50th percentile 27.2 26.0  -0.03 27.2 28.8  0.03 
51-75th percentile 26.0 25.7  -0.01 26.0 25.8  -0.01 
76-100th 
percentile 24.0 23.0 
 -0.02 24.0 21.3  -0.06 
Elixhauser 
Comorbidity 
Index, % 
  
  
    
Acquired Immune 
Deficiency 
syndrome 
0.00 0.00 <.001 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.58 0.00 
Alcohol abuse 0.7 0.2 <.001 0.09 0.6 0.7 0.01 0.01 
Anemia 13.9 15.8 0.001 0.05 13.9 13.6 0.66 -0.01 
Rheumatoid 
arthritis /Collagen 
Vascular Disease 
3.1 2.9 0.003 -0.01 3.1 3.1 0.94 0.00 
Chronic blood loss 
anemia 1.5 0.6 <.001 -0.08 1.5 1.1 0.004 -0.04 
Congestive heart 
failure 4.6 11.6 <.001 0.26 4.6 5.0 0.01 0.01 
Chronic 
pulmonary disease 15.1 18.6 <.001 0.09 15.1 15.8 0.02 0.02 
Coagulopathy 1.8 5.0 <.001 0.18 1.8 2.0 0.07 0.01 
Depression 7.4 8.1 <.001 0.02 7.4 7.2 0.44 -0.01 
Diabetes, 
uncomplicated 18.6 25.6 <.001 0.17 18.6 18.6 0.96 -0.00 
Diabetes, with 
chronic 
complications 
1.5 3.6 
<.001 
0.13 1.5 1.5 0.68 -0.00 
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 Unweighted Weighted 
Drug abuse 0.1 0.3 <.001 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.75 0.00 
Hypertension 68.0 73.7 <.001 0.13 68.0 67.7 0.58 -0.01 
Hypothyroidism 15.3 15.9 0.004 0.02 15.3 15.5 0.46 0.01 
Liver disease 0.5 4.7 <.001 0.27 0.5 0.5 0.002 0.00 
Lymphoma 0.4 0.8 <.001 0.05 0.4 0.4 0.73 0.00 
Fluid and 
electrolyte 
disorders 
10.2 29.1 
<.001 0.49 
10.2 11.1 0.001 
0.02 
Metastatic cancer 0.4 1.5 
.04 0.11 0.4 0.5 <0.001 
0.01 
Neurological 
disorders 5.3 6.2 
<.001 0.04 5.3 5.6 0.05 0.01 
Obesity 7.6 12.6 <.001 0.17 7.6 7.4 0.41 -0.01 
Paralysis 0.8 1.4 .07 0.06 0.8 0.9 0.11 0.01 
Peripheral 
vascular disorders 3.8 7.1 <.001 
0.15 3.8 4.3 <0.001 
0.02 
Psychoses 1.1 1.2 <.001 0.06 1.1 1.1 0.89 -0.00 
Pulmonary 
circulation 
disorders 
1.0 2.8 
<.001 0.13 
1.0 1.1 0.02 
0.01 
Renal failure 4.4 12.7 
<.001 0.30 4.4 5.1 <0.001 
0.03 
   Solid tumor 
without  
   metastasis 
0.9 1.8 
<.001 0.08 
0.9 1.1 0.002 
0.02 
   Peptic ulcer 
disease      
   excluding bleeding 
0.0 0.1 
.18 0.02 
0.0 0.0 0.48 
0.00 
   Valvular disease 5.0 7.3 .04 0.09 5.0 5.0 0.71 -0.00 
Weight loss 0.7 5.4 
<.001 0.28 0.7 0.8 <0.001 
0.01 
Location and 
Teaching Status, %   0.02 
    0.009 
 
Rural 7.4 10.4  0.11 7.4 8.2  0.03 
Urban, non 
teaching 52.9 48.7 
 -0.10 52.9 59.1  0.12 
   Urban, teaching 39.7 40.9  0.04 39.7 32.7  -0.14 
Ownership, %   <.001    0.92  
Government 47.3 9.8  -0.92 47.3 47.1  -0.01 
Private 52.7 90.2  0.92 52.7 52.9  0.01 
Bed Size, %   0.02    0.99  
Small 12.4 11.7  -0.03 12.4 12.3  -0.01 
Medium 22.9 27.7  0.11 22.9 23.0  0.00 
Large 64.7 60.7  -0.08 64.7 64.7  0.01 
NOTES Other race included Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others. Test 
performed is Chi-square test for categorical variables and t-test for continuous variables. Rows 
may not add up to 100%, due to rounding. Unweighted characteristics are not propensity score-
  
155 
weighted, but survey weights are accounted for. T = Target group; C = Control group; Pre = Pre-
policy period; Post = Post-policy period; SMD = Standardized difference in means. 
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Appendix Table 4.5 Characteristics of inpatient stays in the treatment group by patients’ race 
(propensity score weighted) 
 
Characteristics 
White 
(n = 931,132) 
Black 
(n = 56,235) 
Hispanic 
(n = 50,277) 
Other 
(n = 39,956) 
Gender, %     
Male 40.0 32.0 38.1 36.6 
Female 60.0 68.0 61.9 63.4 
Median Income 
Quartile, %     
   0-25th percentile 22.4 48.6 35.6 19.7 
26-50th percentile 28.3 24.1 23.9 22.9 
51-75th percentile 26.0 16.5 24.9+ 26.5+ 
76-100th percentile 23.3 10.8 15.6 30.9 
Age, mean (SD), years 75.2 (0.04) 73.6 (0.06) 74.4 (0.08) 75.0+ (0.11) 
Comorbidities,  
mean (SD), No. 1.9 (0.01) 2.3 (0.02) 2.1 (0.04) 2.0 (0.02) 
Location and Teaching 
Status, %     
Rural 8.3 5.5 2.7 4.8 
Urban, non teaching 56.5 45.7 59.6+ 55.3+ 
Urban, teaching 35.2 48.9 37.7+ 39.9+ 
Ownership, %     
Government 48.5 53.3 42.7+ 44.8+ 
Private 51.5 46.7 57.3+ 55.1+ 
Bed Size, %     
Small 12.0 10.4+ 10.4+ 16.6+ 
Medium 22.6 20.7 22.2 23.2 
Large 65.4 68.9+ 67.4 60.2 
Elective Surgery, % 78.2 75.1 75.1 76.2+ 
Receiving care in 
minority-serving 
hospitals, % 5.8 17.1 50.6 44.0 
Receiving care in low 
income-serving 
hospitals, % 11.3 12.8+ 15.7+ 8.0 
NOTES Test performed is t-test of difference relative to white. Comorbidities are the sum of the 
29 modified Elixhauser comorbidities. Rows may not add up to 100%, due to rounding.  
+p >0.05 versus white.  
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Appendix Table 4.6 Characteristics of inpatient stays in the treatment group by patients’ income 
(propensity score weighted) 
 
Characteristics 
Higher-income 
(n = 828,088) 
Low-income 
(n = 249,512) 
Gender, %   
Male 39.8 38.1 
Female 60.2 61.9 
Age, mean (SD), years 75.2 (0.04) 73.6 (0.06) 
Comorbidities, mean (SD), No. 1.9 (0.01) 2.3 (0.02) 
Location and Teaching Status, %   
Rural 5.3 16.0 
Urban, non teaching 57.8 50.7 
Urban, teaching 36.9 33.3 
Ownership, %   
Government 47.5 51.1 
Private 52.5 48.9 
Bed Size, %   
Small 12.4 10.8 
Medium 23.2 20.2 
Large 64.4 69.0 
Elective Surgery, % 78.9 74.7 
Receiving care in minority-serving hospitals, % 9.1 10.0+ 
Receiving care in low income-serving hospitals, % 4.9 32.1 
NOTES Test performed is t-test of difference relative to white. Comorbidities are the sum of the 
29 modified Elixhauser comorbidities. Rows may not add up to 100%, due to rounding.  
+p >0.05 versus higher-income 
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Appendix Table 4.7 Characteristics of hospitals for treatment group patients by hospitals’ 
minority and low-income serving status (propensity score weighted) 
 
Characteristics 
Minority-
Serving 
(n = 714) 
Non-
Minority 
Serving  
(n = 4,696) 
P 
Value 
Low-Income 
Serving 
(n = 688) 
Higher- 
Income 
Serving 
(n = 4,722) 
P 
Value 
Location and 
Teaching 
Status, % 
  .01   <.001 
Rural 3.3 8.3  31.8 4.2  
Urban,  
non teaching 53.5 56.3  43.6 57.2  
Urban,    
teaching 43.2 35.3  24.6 38.6  
Ownership, %   .99   .82 
Government 48.4 48.4  49.9 48.9  
Private 51.6 51.6  50.2 51.1  
Bed Size, %   .90   .79 
Small 11.9 12.8  12.5 11.9  
Medium 22.6 22.2  20.5 22.8  
Large 65.5 65.0  67.0 65.3  
Hospital 
Volume, median 
(IQR) 
1094  
(464-2039) 
1430  
(594-3112) .003 
864 
(492-1567) 
1509  
(604-3178) <.001 
NOTES Test performed is Chi-square test. Rows may not add up to 100%, due to rounding. 
HAC-POA = Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; IQR = interquartile range. 
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Appendix Table 4.8 Unadjusted surgical complication incidence rates in the treatment group by 
patients’ race and income (propensity score weighted) 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Pre Policy 
Period 
(2005-2008) 
(%) 
Post Policy 
Period 
(2009-2015) 
(%) 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
(%) 
(95% CI) 
Unadjusted 
Difference-in-
differences 
 (%) 
(95% CI) 
Surgical Site Infection 
White 0.35 0.32 -0.03 (-0.12 to 0.06) – 
Black 0.43 0.41 -0.02 (-0.35 to 0.30) 
0.01 
(-0.33 to 0.35) 
Hispanic 0.59 0.36 -0.24 (-0.65 to 0.18) 
-0.20 
(-0.62 to 0.21) 
Other 0.56 0.90 0.35 (-0.17 to 0.87) 
0.38 
(-0.14 to 0.90) 
     
Non-low income 0.36 0.34 -0.03 (-0.13 to 0.07) – 
Low income 0.42 0.38 -0.04 (-0.22 to 0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.21 to 0.19) 
Deep Vein Thrombosis 
White 0.70 0.52 -0.19
** 
(-0.29 to -0.08) – 
Black 0.86 0.73 -0.12 (-0.44 to 0.19) 
0.06 
(-0.26 to 0.39) 
Hispanic 0.94 0.63 -0.31
* 
(-0.66 to 0.03) 
-0.13 
(-0.48 to 0.23) 
Other 0.78 0.55 -0.23 (-0.60 to 0.14) 
-0.04 
(-0.42 to 0.34) 
     
Non-low income 0.74 0.55 -0.19 (-0.31 to -0.06) – 
Low income 0.64 0.46 -0.19 (-0.30 to -0.07) 
-0.00 
(-0.16 to 0.16) 
SOURCE Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015.  
NOTES Pre-post differences and difference-in-differences are changes in percentage points. 
Treatment group includes patients who underwent the targeted procedures of the HAC-POA 
policy (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total 
knee and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). Other race included 
Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others Low-income included hospital stays of 
patients residing in the lowest income quartile in a zip code. Higher-income included hospital 
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stays of patients residing in the income quartiles of 25% to 100% in a zip code. P values are not 
shown for pre- and post-policy period. CI = confidence interval.  
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
161 
Appendix Table 4.9 Unadjusted surgical complication incidence rates in the treatment group by 
hospitals’ minority and low-income serving status (propensity score weighted) 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Pre Policy 
Period 
(2005-2008) 
(%) 
Post Policy 
Period 
(2009-2015) 
(%) 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
(95% CI) 
Unadjusted 
Difference-in-
differences 
(95% CI) 
Surgical Site Infection 
Non-minority serving 0.34 0.34 -0.001 
(-0.09 to 0.09) 
– 
Minority serving 0.64 0.40 -0.23 
(-0.59 to 0.12) 
-0.23 
(-0.59 to 0.13) 
     
Higher-income serving 0.38 0.35 -0.02 
(-0.12 to 0.08) 
– 
Low-income serving 0.36 0.27 -0.09 
(-0.32 to 0.13) 
-0.07 
(-0.32 to 0.18) 
Deep Vein Thrombosis  
Non-minority serving 0.70 0.53 -0.17** 
(-0.28 to -0.06) 
– 
Minority serving 0.98 0.53 -0.44** 
(-0.71 to -0.17) 
-0.28* 
(-0.57 to 0.02) 
     
Higher-income serving 0.75 0.54 -0.21*** 
(-0.32 to -0.09) 
– 
Low-income serving 0.50 0.45 -0.05 
(-0.21 to 0.10) 
0.16 
(-0.04 to 0.35) 
SOURCE Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015.  
NOTES Pre-post differences and difference-in-differences are changes in percentage points. P 
Treatment group includes patients who underwent the targeted procedures of the HAC-POA 
policy (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic [spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total 
knee and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric procedures). Minority-serving 
hospitals were defined as the highest decile of hospitals, by the proportion of black and Hispanic 
patients. The other 90% of hospitals were categorized as non-minority serving hospitals. Low-
income-serving hospitals were the top 10% of hospitals that serve patients whose median income 
is below 25% for patient’s zip code. The other 90% of hospitals were categorized as non-low-
income serving hospitals. P values are now shown for pre- and post-policy period. Difference-in-
differences = (Minority serving Post – Minority serving Pre) – (Non minority serving Post – Non 
minority serving Pre), or (Low income serving Post – Low income serving Pre) – (Higher 
income serving Post – Higher income serving Pre).  
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001 
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Appendix Table 4.10 Effects of the HAC-POA policy on adjusted surgical complication 
incidence rates for Medicare patients in the treatment group and the control group by patients’ 
race (binary) and hospitals’ ownership 
 
Outcome 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 
 
DD 
(Treatment 
vs. Control)  
 
 
DDD 
(vs. White) 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Surgical Site Infection     
White -0.10 0.15 -0.26* – 
Minority 0.05 0.51** -0.56* -0.31 
     
Private 0.07 0.18 -0.10 – 
Public -0.30 0.19 -0.50** -0.39 
Deep Vein Thrombosis     
White 0.01 0.05 -0.05 – 
Minority 0.06 -0.10 0.16 0.21 
     
Private 0.04 -0.01 0.05 – 
Public -0.02 0.07 -0.09 -0.14 
SOURCE Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015.  
NOTES Changes are in percentage points. A treatment group includes patients who underwent 
the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic 
[spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric 
procedures). A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a 
cholecystectomy. Minority included any of non-Hispanic white patients (black, Hispanic, Asian, 
Pacific Islander, Native American, and others). P values are not shown for post-pre difference. 
HAC-POA = Hospital Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; DD = Difference-in-
differences = (Treatment Post – Treatment Pre) – (Control Post – Contorl Pre); DDD = 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences = (DD Minority – DD White). 
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 
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Appendix Table 4.11 Effects of the HAC-POA policy on adjusted surgical complication 
incidence rates for Medicare patients in the treatment group and the control group by patients’ 
race and income and by hospitals’ minority and low-income serving status from the logistic 
regression model (propensity score weighted) 
 
Outcome 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 
 
DD 
(Treatment 
vs. Control)  
 
 
DDD 
 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Surgical Site Infection     
Patients’ characteristics     
White 0.07 0.51** -0.44** – 
Black 0.09 1.01** -0.92** -0.47 
Hispanic -0.14 0.75** -0.89** -0.45 
Other 0.52* 0.92** -0.40 0.05 
     
Low income 0.06 0.51** -0.46** – 
Non-income 0.08 0.64** -0.56** -0.10 
Hospitals’ status     
Non-minority serving 0.10 0.54** -0.44** – 
Minority serving -0.13 0.68** -0.81** -0.37 
     
Non-low income serving 0.09 0.54** -0.46** – 
Low income serving -0.04 0.66* -0.71* -0.24 
Deep Vein Thrombosis     
Patients’ characteristics     
White -0.17 -0.10 -0.07 – 
Black -0.07 -0.26 0.18 0.25 
Hispanic -0.14 -0.41** 0.27 0.34 
Other -0.19 -0.22* 0.02 0.09 
     
Low income -0.16 -0.09 -0.07 – 
Non-income -0.17 -0.22** 0.05 0.12 
Hospitals’ status     
Non-minority serving -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 – 
Minority serving -0.39* -0.22 -0.17 -0.14 
     
Non-low income serving -0.18 -0.10 -0.08 – 
Low income serving -0.11 -0.39** 0.27* 0.36** 
SOURCE Authors’ analysis of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project data for 2005-2015.  
NOTES Changes are in percentage points. A treatment group includes patients who underwent 
the HAC-POA policy’s targeted procedures (cardiac [implantable electronic devices], orthopedic 
[spine, neck, shoulder, elbow, total knee, and total hip replacement], and obesity-related bariatric 
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procedures). A control group includes patients who underwent an appendectomy and a 
cholecystectomy. Other race included Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and others. 
Low-income included hospital stays of patients residing in the lowest income quartile in a zip 
code. Higher-income included hospital stays of patients residing in the income quartiles of 25% 
to 100% in a zip code. P values are not shown for post-pre difference. HAC-POA = Hospital  
Acquired Conditions-Present On Admission; DD = Difference-in-differences = (Treatment Post 
– Treatment Pre) – (Control Post – Control Pre); DDD = Difference-in-difference-in-differences 
= (DD Minority – DD White) or (DD Low income – DD Non-low income) or (DD Minority 
serving – DD Non-minority serving) or (DD Low income serving – DD Non-low income 
serving)  
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 
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Appendix. Statistical Methods 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences Models 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) method is an extension of difference-in-
differences (DD), which is an econometric method intended to overcome issues with the 
selection of unobservables. DD has been widely used in the evaluation of healthcare policies.39 
The basic idea of DDD is a difference in a DD estimator that compares outcomes for the 
treatment group (the group exposed to the intervention) and the control group (the group not 
exposed to the intervention) before and after the intervention. Thus, DDD is any difference 
between the treatment and control groups in the pre-intervention period and the post-intervention 
period among subgroups (in the context of this study, between minority and white or between 
hospitals that serve vulnerable populations and those that do not). We specified our DDD model, 
by entering a triple interaction term – Treat × Post × Minority or Hospitals that serve vulnerable 
populations – and estimated the model, using the following equation, to examine whether the 
policy has had different effects on certain subgroups: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$ = 𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑀!"#$ + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!  + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!×𝑀!"#$ + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! × 𝑀!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗𝑀!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑃!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝛽!"𝐻! ++𝛽!!𝐼! + 𝛽!"𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝑢!"#$ 
 
, where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠!"#$ is the outcome for patient i in hospital j receiving procedure k at time t,  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is equal to 1 if the procedure is targeted by the policy, Post is equal to 1 for after the third 
quarter of 2008, M is equal to 1 if patient is non-White, or treated in minority- or the poor- 
serving hospitals, P is a vector of patient characteristics, Z is a vector of hospital characteristics, 
and H, I, and Year are vectors of hospital, procedure and year fixed effects, respectively. In this 
equation, coefficient 𝛽! is the main interest of our analyses: estimator for minority or low-
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income patients or patients who were treated in minority-or the low-income-serving hospitals. If 𝛽! has a positive sign, this indicates that the policy has worsened surgical outcomes (increased 
incidence of surgical site infection and deep vein thrombosis) in minority or low-income patients 
or hospitals serving them. The following table demonstrates how the DDD estimator can be 
calculated. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our results. First, we reran 
the models using an alternative threshold of the top quartile to identify minority-serving and low-
income-community serving hospitals similar to a prior study.26 Second, we repeated our analyses 
by aggregating all minority patients into one group and then compared the changes in outcomes 
with those for white patients, given that minority patients are composed of smaller proportions of 
various minority groups in the sample. Third, we performed analyses defining hospitals serving 
vulnerable populations using public ownership (public vs. private hospitals), because it is known 
that public hospitals are widely acknowledged to overlap with minority-serving hospitals.32 
 Minority Before P4P  After P4P  Difference 
Treatment Minority O!"#$!,!"#,!"#$%"&' 
= B 
O!"#$!,!"#$,!"#$%"&' 
= A 
𝐴 − 𝐵 
Control Minority O!"#$%"&,!"#,!"#$%"&' = D O!"#$%"&,!"#$,!"#$%"&' = C 𝐶 − 𝐷 
Difference-in-differences   (A−B) − (C−D) 
Treatment White	 O!"#$!,!"#,!"#$% = F O!"#$!,!"#$,!"#$% = E 𝐸 − 𝐹 
Control White	 O!"#$%"&,!"#,!"#$% = H	 O!"#$%"&,!"#$,!"#$% = G 𝐺 − 𝐻 
Difference-in-differences  (E−F) − (G−H) 
Difference-in-difference-
in-differences   
[(A−B) − 
(C−D)] – 
[(E−F) − 
(G−H)] 
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Fourth, we repeated all models using logistic regressions to check whether results were 
consistent with the results from the linear probability model. Fifth, we repeated our analyses 
using one-to-one matching without replacement, calipers of 0.02 (calculated by 0.25 × standard 
deviation of propensity score),37 and enforcing common support. Last, we repeated our analyses, 
adjusted for group-specific time trends to allow for differential time trends during the pre-policy 
period.39 
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Summary 
This dissertation provides rich evidence on the effects of P4P policy by addressing three 
critical questions: (1) what is the payment design that optimizes P4P programs, (2) was the 
HAC-POA policy effective in improving the quality of care and reducing costs, and (3) did the 
HAC-POA policy have potential negative effects for surgical patients. Forward-looking 
implications for practice, research, and policy are discussed in the following section.  
Practice, Research, and Policy Implications 
Practice implications. It is important to consider how the design of P4P programs may 
affect providers’ perception of P4P and their motivation, given that successful implementation 
relies in part on provider motivation to change clinical practice. Further, the expansion of P4P 
programs and the changes in quality and cost outcomes under P4P can significantly impact the 
practice and work environment of providers. Because the frontline workforce (e.g., nurses) plays 
a pivotal role in adopting interventions,1 how P4P affects their practice and work environment is 
directly related to performance improvement under P4P. Additionally, P4P can affect the ability 
of hospitals to provide quality care, especially for those disproportionately treat higher risk 
patients or lack resources. This dissertation has three implications of P4P programs on practice.  
1. Providers. Providers who are not voluntarily participating in P4P programs may not 
have as much motivation as expected, as indicated in Chapter 2. Providers, especially physicians, 
are accustomed to hierarchies.2 They are trained to make decisions with confidence and to 
proceed with treatment, often under uncertainty.2 They are also trained to take responsibility and 
to be dependable.2 These characteristics make it difficult for providers to accept directions from 
non-physician providers, such as staff from government agencies or insurance companies, who 
carry out performance reports and initiate payment guidelines for P4P programs.2 In addition, 
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providers may perceive that P4P underappreciates their responsibility and contributions and 
limits their autonomy, especially when participation in P4P programs is not voluntary.  
2. Healthcare workforce.  
       A. Workforce development. Gains received from P4P programs could help hospitals 
invest in education and training for the workforce to improve interdisciplinary collaboration and 
teamwork and encourage shared decision-making.1 This could help disseminate P4P programs, 
and, in turn, lead to better patient outcomes and efficient delivery of care.3  
     B. Burden on workforce. However, P4P could negatively impact the workforce. The 
efforts toward improving quality could become a burden.1,4 Frontline healthcare workers, 
especially nurses, may receive the blame for evaluation criteria that did not meet the P4P 
standard.1,4 A loss in reimbursement under P4P could result in cutting workforce costs, 
especially to nurses.1 Because nurses make up about 54% of the healthcare workforce,5 reducing 
nurse staffing might be appealing to hospitals that need to cut their budgets. For example, 
although not studied empirically to the best of my knowledge, a study that examined nurses’ 
perceptions about P4P reported the concern about reductions in staffing and increased workload.1 
In addition, a study showed that hospitals might compromise quality when they encounter a 
severe financial challenge.6 Despite initial reduction in staffing bringing cost savings in the short 
term, cutting costs to the workforce may in the long term worsen hospitals’ financial stability. 
Inadequate nurse staffing increases the workload and likely turnover among nurses, thus 
imposing substantial costs to hosptials.7 Outcomes of care could also worsen because nurse 
staffing and burnout are important factors influencing surgical outcomes.8  
3. Hospitals. P4P can also have a considerable impact on the practice of hospitals that 
serve socioeconomically disadvantaged patients, as suggested in Chapter 4. Hospitals serving 
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vulnerable patients who already have limited access to resources could suffer from worsened 
outcomes and could be further financially compromised under P4P, limiting their ability to 
provide quality care to patients. P4P could also result in the unintended consequence that 
hospitals change their coding to avoid penalties (i.e., misreporting hospital acquired conditions). 
Research implications. This dissertation indicates a few research priorities that future 
studies may want to address, including: (1) assessing design features attributed to the effect of, 
(2) identifying the mechanisms of unintended consequences including (a) assessing the impact of 
P4P on areas not targeted by the program, (b) examining the effect of P4P on the practice of 
providers and hospitals, (c) determining the impact of P4P on the healthcare workforce, and (3) 
evaluating whether P4P is effective from the perspective of hospitals and providers, not just 
payers. 
1. Assessing design features attributed to the effect of P4P. This dissertation focuses on 
one of the key issues related to P4P design and indicates the need for more studies to determine 
the best incentive types (i.e., incentive vs. penalty vs. combinations of them). It is still unknown 
how other P4P design features (e.g., performance measures and size, frequency, and timing of 
incentives) affect outcomes and future research should address these issues. Studies examining 
which performance measure (i.e., absolute vs. relative performance) is more effective are 
needed. Absolute performance measures are more common than relative performance measures 
because they are more acceptable to providers due to transparency.9,10 However, P4P programs 
based on absolute performance measures may not motivate poor performers, or providers and 
organizations already exceeding the threshold to improve quality of care. Regarding incentive 
size, further studies are needed to determine the optimal incentive size that will compensate for 
program start-up costs while incentivizing providers and hospitals to make behavioral changes 
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under P4P. For the frequency and timing of incentives, future research should examine if 
distributing a series of smaller, frequent payments is more effective than providing large lump-
sum incentives because of the tendency of people to discount future gains.9,11,12 Also necessary 
are studies evaluating what to incentivize (e.g., structure vs. process vs. outcomes or specific vs. 
broad domains of care) and whom to distribute the incentives to (e.g., individual provider level 
vs. team level vs. hospital level) to maximize the effect of P4P. Because P4P designs and 
evaluations of their effects are complex and multifactorial, it may take time for the body of 
research examining the contributions of P4P designs on the effects of P4P to grow. Nevertheless, 
further research using rigorous design and methodologies to investigate the impact of P4P 
designs is clearly warranted. In addition to design features, other factors, such as the duration of 
P4P implementation, might affect the potential magnitude of P4P’s effects.  
2. Identifying mechanisms of unintended consequence.  
      A. Areas not targeted by P4P. The evidence from Chapter 3 suggests that the P4P 
program for Medicare-insured surgical patients had positive effects on the outcomes that were 
not directly targeted, such as the length of stay and hospital costs. These findings are based on a 
rigorous study design that accounts for time-invariant confounders. Nonetheless, it will be 
important for future research to evaluate whether similar results are observed in other outcome 
measures and other surgical specialties, because providers and hospitals may focus on specific 
areas of care targeted by P4P or tasks with fewer barriers and higher revenue while ignoring 
difficult resource-consuming tasks (known as teaching to the test). 
      B. Provider and hospital practice. The results yielded by this dissertation also serve 
as a warning that negative outcomes attributed to P4P programs exist. Future studies should 
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examine whether providers and hospitals experience pressures that may lead to worse care, such 
as discharging patients too soon.13,14 
     C. Healthcare workforce. No studies have quantified the impact of P4P on the 
healthcare workforce despite their central role in improving quality of care. Research specific to 
the healthcare workforce would benefit the healthcare delivery because the workforce, especially 
frontline providers (i.e., nurses), may be exposed to a formidable work environment due to 
extended workload and the potential blame for adverse outcomes under P4P. Research that 
identifies interventions that encourage teamwork and collaboration1,15 and create systems for a 
blame-free work environment16 may also offer additional insights into the successful 
implementation of P4P. 
3. Hospital and provider perspectives on P4P. The current literature has failed to 
consider providers’ and hospitals’ opinions in the evaluations of P4P. For example, operational 
costs in response to P4P are ignored in the majority of studies.17 These include costs for 
instituting the program, such as implementing an electronic health record system for care 
documentation, additional staff for data entry, and resources for evaluating the quality of 
care.17,18 Failure to set up appropriate infrastructure may directly impact payments from P4P 
because performance measures of providers and hospitals rely heavily on administrative data.18 
Given that monitoring the quality in response to P4P is time- and resource-consuming and given 
that reward-based P4P programs may not offset hospitals’ investment, future studies should 
determine if operational costs may have contributed to the null findings that P4P did not improve 
the value of care, as observed in other studies. Similarly, providers may experience time and 
resource constraints that undermine the benefits earned from P4P.  
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Policy implications. Although P4P programs have become a common strategy, if 
resources and time invested to improve quality are not offset by the benefits of P4P programs, 
P4P will soon face resistance from providers and hospitals as well as a political backlash. This 
dissertation research provides a few insights for policy makers. 
1. Designing P4P. How, who, and what to incentivize are key issues of the P4P program 
designs. An optimally designed P4P program will be a tool for policy makers and providers in 
delivering effective and efficient care. Some have argued that individual-level rewards may be 
the most effective way to improve performance because incentives are not diluted to the group 
level from the economic perspectives,9,19–21 whereas others support the opposite.22 Policy makers 
should consider two factors when designing the incentives of P4P: (1) interdependency and 
collegiality between disciplines in the healthcare workforce and (2) various incentive structures 
that hospitals face from multiple P4P programs. Finding an incentive structure that shares 
accountability,1 that values collaborative care,23 and that supports provider and hospital efforts to 
implement a customized intervention is an important win-win approach to improve quality and 
lower costs for patients, providers, and payers. Having multidisciplinary input from nursing, 
medicine, economics, sociology and psychology in the design of P4P programs will help to 
obtain answers to these questions. 
2. Continuation and expansion of P4P. Policy makers seek to improve quality and 
decrease the costs of care by incentivizing providers and hospitals, and evidence from this 
dissertation supports that effort. While evidence on the impact of P4P is mixed in the current 
literature, this dissertation is not the first study to document evidence of the effectiveness of P4P 
by utilizing a penalty design to improve quality or decrease costs. As the healthcare arena shifts 
from fee-for-service to value-based payments, policy makers and other payers may consider the 
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continuation and expansion of the same or similar P4P policies and their revision, based on this 
further evidence provided by this dissertation. 
3. Monitoring of potential negative consequences. As health is becoming more 
recognized as a human right,24 governments and policy makers have an important role in 
delivering adequate healthcare to the population, including surgical care. Surgical care has been 
a critical component of healthcare for managing various health conditions, including traumatic 
injuries, infections, and many non-communicable diseases, such as cancer and coronary artery 
disease.25,26 Although surgical care is often the only option for improving health status, such as 
for trauma cases, it comes with a higher probability of causing substantial harm due to the 
complexity of care.25 Despite the numerous efforts that have been made to improve surgical care, 
disparities in surgical outcomes continue to exist. The findings of this dissertation confirm a gap 
in quality following the implementation of P4P for patients treated in low-income serving 
hospitals. Policy mandates for P4P should be carefully monitored to ensure that they do not 
further jeopardize patients and hospitals that are in the direst need of resources and care 
improvement. Policy makers should also deliberately make a greater effort to promote equity in 
surgical care. 
Conclusion 
P4P can be a promising strategy if it is designed carefully and targets the correct 
populations. This dissertation represents a new body of evidence showing that a mandated 
national P4P program utilizing a penalty design has been effective in improving quality and 
reducing costs in surgical settings. It also emphasizes the importance of understanding and 
monitoring the effects of P4P implementations on certain subgroups of patients or organizations 
that may be more prone to experiencing worsened outcomes, thus further widening existing 
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disparities. Even though this dissertation empirically studied only one P4P program – the HAC-
POA policy – its findings and implications apply across settings and populations to all P4P 
programs that use a penalty design. 
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